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ABSTRACT 
 
 
DYNAMIC MODELS OF THE INSURANCE MARKETS 
 
BY 
 
Ning Wang 
 
August 2013 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Martin Grace 
 
Major Academic Unit: Department of Risk Management and Insurance 
 
 
 
This is a multi-essay dissertation in the area of dynamic models of the insurance markets. I study issues 
in insurance markets by examining individual behavior and industry performance in dynamic settings. 
My first essay studies household life insurance demand and saving decisions by applying a 
heterogeneous-agent life cycle model with wage shocks and mortality shocks. This essay proposes the 
most important determinants of household life insurance demand, and shows the joint decision of life 
insurance purchase between couples. My second essay focuses on the property-liability insurance 
market, and aims to study the impact of one catastrophe event on an insurer’s underwritings and capital 
raising strategy. The two-period cash flow model is built to also explore what kind of insurers can 
benefit from catastrophic risk underwritings. My third essay extends the second essay by incorporating 
a dynamic cash flow model with a series of loss shocks. I find the dynamic interaction between the 
insurer’s balance sheet and its capital rationing resulting from loss shocks. The model generates a 
non-cyclical behavior of output changes in the insurance market, and this suggests the current 
asymmetric, unpredictable and random underwriting cycles are temporary responses to loss shocks.  
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Overview  
 
This dissertation aims to study issues in financial and insurance markets by examining 
individual behavior and industry performance in dynamic settings. In life insurance 
market, I focus on the household life insurance demand and saving decisions. I also 
explore catastrophic risk and underwriting cycles in the property-liability insurance 
industry.  
There is no consensus about the amount and the distribution of household life 
insurance holdings in empirical research due to the limited data of household life 
insurance purchases at the policy level (see Chambers, Schlagenhauf and Young, 2003; 
Grace and Lin 2007). I apply dynamic models with stochastic process to my research 
in exploring the relation of household life insurance purchases and household 
characteristics by a heterogeneous-agent life cycle model (see Chambers, 
Schlagenhauf and Young, 2009, 2011; Nishiyama, 2010). In my first essay, I construct 
a life cycle model of heterogeneous married households with wage shocks and 
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mortality shocks to quantitatively analyze household life insurance demand. Although 
the life insurance demand results in the model are higher than the observed data in 
Chamber, Schlagenhauf, and Young (2003), it is lower than their model results in 
2009 and 2011. I also discuss the reasons in this essay. My results suggest that the 
most important determinants of life insurance demand are financial vulnerability, the 
amount of financial support needed and life insurance premium. Moreover, this paper 
can contribute to the simulation of the joint decision of life insurance purchases 
between married couples, and analyze risk sharing between couples with wage shocks 
and mortality shocks. I find that if one receives a good wage shock, she/he will 
increase her/his labor time and life insurance coverage holding, while her/his spouse 
will decrease his/her labor time and life insurance coverage holding.  
In the property-liability insurance market, sharp price increases and large capacity 
swings follow catastrophic loss shocks, such as those caused by a catastrophic natural 
disaster or a significant macro economic event (see Winter 1988; Gron 1994; Grace 
and Hotchkiss, 1995; Gron and Winton 2001; Cummins and Nini, 2002; Doherty, 
Lamm-Tennant, and Stark, 2003; Grace and Klein, 2009). With the possibility of more 
frequent and severe catastrophe events, it is vital to understand how insurers and the 
insurance industry can respond in the post-catastrophe period.  
In my second essay, I extend a two-period risky debt model (see Cummins and 
Danzon, 1997) into a two-period cash flow model with one catastrophic risk for an 
insurer by involving both a reinsurance market and a costly external capital market. I 
focus on analyzing an insurer’s optimal strategy with capacity constraints or without 
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capacity constraints in an environment of catastrophic shocks. The model contributes 
to suggest that the insurer has an optimal capital structure in costly capital market, and 
the solvency ratio plays an important role in the interaction between its ability to sell 
new business and to raise external capital. I find that in the situation of a tight capital 
supply and high insurance demand, the positive relationship between catastrophic 
losses and insurance prices and the negative relationship between losses and insurance 
coverage capacity can be observed. The model also implies that one catastrophe event 
could act as an accelerated trigger, splitting insurers into high-quality ones and 
low-quality ones with respect to different underwriting efficiencies and capital raising 
abilities. The results indicate that the differences between good and bad insurers will 
be larger with more volatile catastrophes.  
Underwriting cycles in early studies are always described as smooth, symmetric 
and predictable curves (see Venezian, 1985; Cummins and Outreville, 1987; Chen, 
Wong, and Lee, 1999; Meier, 2006). In recent years, ups and downs of underwriting 
cycles are more likely to be asymmetric, unpredictable and random (See Boyer, 
Jacquier and Van Norden, 2012). In my third essay, I extend the model developed in 
the second essay by incorporating dynamic settings to explore an alternative source of 
“underwriting cycles”. I look at the “underwriting cycles” in output markets in the 
insurance industry by using a dynamic model inspired by the Real Business Cycle 
literature (see Winter, 1994; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). I claim the unpredictable 
“underwriting cycles” as temporary responses of the industrial coverage capacity to 
insured losses. I build a dynamic cash flow model of an insurer with a series of 
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catastrophe events in an environment of the costly external capital and insurance 
regulation to simulate the insurer’s optimal catastrophic risk intermediation strategy. 
The model contributes to show that the dynamic interaction between the insurer’s 
capital rationing and its balance sheet can generate the non-cyclical behavior of output 
changes if the insurer experiences a series of unexpected catastrophic shocks.  
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2 
	
The Life Insurance Demand in a 
Heterogeneous-Agent Life Cycle Economy 
 
Term life insurance can be purchased to mitigate financial problems resulting from 
premature death risk. By holding term life insurance, a household can hedge against 
the decline in total household income due to the death of a wage earner, and parents 
can provide financial security for dependents after their death.  
There is no consensus on the amount of household life insurance holdings in 
empirical research due to the limit of data sources. In this paper, I construct a 
heterogeneous-agent life cycle model of married households with wage shocks and 
mortality shocks to quantitatively analyze the life insurance demand by heterogeneous 
households. I focus on exploring the relation of household life insurance purchases 
and household characteristics. Moreover, this paper contributes to the understanding 
of the joint decision of life insurance purchases between married couples, and thus to 
the analysis of financial risk sharing between couples in a household with wage 
 6 
 
shocks and mortality shocks. 
In my model, the peak of the household’s life insurance coverage holdings in the 
economy is on average $370,000 occurring at age 33. My results suggest that the most 
important determinants of life insurance demand are financial vulnerability, the 
amount of financial support needed and life insurance premium. I also find that the 
peak of life insurance demand for single-parent households is well before couple 
households. In addition, increasing the number of children attributes a large increase 
of life insurance demand in single-parent households, but has no significant effect on 
couple households. Moreover, I discuss the impact of wage shocks on the joint 
decision of life insurance purchases between couples: one’s good wage shock results 
in an increase of one’s working hours and life insurance demand, but a decrease of 
spouse’s working hours and life insurance demand.  
 
2.1 Introduction 
A household’s life insurance demand depends on the household characteristics and the 
economic situation. There is no consensus about the amount and the distribution of 
household life insurance holdings in empirical research since the data of household 
life insurance purchases is limited.  
Chambers, Schlagenhauf, and Young (2003) examine life insurance data from the 
SCF1 for 1995, 1998 and 2001, and find that the peak of life insurance holdings is on 
average $250,0002 in year 2001 dollars occurring around 50 years old. Grace and Lin 
                                                              
1  Survey of Consumer Finances 
2  $250,000 in 2001 can be adjusted to be $302,000 in 2009 by inflation rates. 
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(2007) examine SCF data for 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2001, and show the mean of the 
face value of household term life insurance in selected data is $366,2633 in year 2001 
dollars. They create a new financial vulnerability index, and find that the most 
significant relationship between life insurance holdings and financial vulnerability is 
among younger households from age 20 to 34. In addition, they find that older 
households from age 50 to 64 tend to use less life insurance to protect a certain level 
of financial vulnerability than middle-aged households from age 35 to 49. LIMRA 
International4 (2004) reports that the average life insurance coverage needed for a 
typical household is $459,0005 while the average life insurance owned is actually 
$126,000, which means the average underinsurance is more than $300,000.  
Chambers, Schlagenhauf, and Young (2009, 2011) construct an 
overlapping-generations (OLG) model to find an economic puzzle that life insurance 
holdings simulated in their model are much larger than their observed data in 
Chambers, Schlagenhauf, and Young (2003). The peak of life insurance holdings is 
twice as much as their empirical study in 2003, occurring at age 30 instead6. In this 
paper, I construct a dynamic model with household earnings simulated by stochastic 
process to quantitatively analyze life insurance holdings of heterogeneous households, 
and compare my results with the empirical study. As a result of my simulation, the 
peak of household life insurance holdings in the model economy is around $370,000 
                                                              
3  Their study shows the median, the mean, and the maximum of term life insurance holdings in their selected data 
are $56,700, $366,263 and $80,000,000 in year 2001 dollars, which can be respectively adjusted to be $68,700, 
$443,700 and $97,000,000 in year 2009 dollars. 
4  Life Insurance Marketing and Research Association International 
5  $459,000 in 2004 can be adjusted to be $ 521,300 in year 2009 dollars. Similarly, the following $126,000 and 
$300,000 in 2004 can be adjusted to be $143,100 and $ 340,700 in year 2009 dollars.   
6  They choose a small value of risk aversion (1.5) in their OLG model to provide a lower bound for estimation. 
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occurring at age 33. The simulated result is lower than the theoretical study from 
Chambers, Schlagenhauf, and Young (2009). I also discuss reasons why the life 
insurance holdings in my model turn out to be higher than the empirical study from 
Chambers, Schlagenhauf, and Young (2003).  
The SCF data contains information only on the total amount of life insurance held 
by each household, and not on the division of life insurance between couples. The 
dynamic model developed in this chapter can also be used to analyze the joint life 
insurance purchases decision of married couples.  
The literature on dynamic models with stochastic process shed light on my 
research. Hong and Rios-Rull (2007) build an OLG model to analyze the join decision 
of social security, life insurance and annuities for households. In their model, they 
assume that agents have a bequest motive and focus on the implications of social 
security under a variety of baseline economies that differ in the extent to which life 
insurance and annuities are available. Chambers, Schlagenhauf, and Young (2009) 
construct an OLG model to find the economic puzzle mentioned above, but they do 
not aim to explore the join decision of life insurance holdings in a household. 
Nishiyama (2010) develop an OLG model with uninsurable wage shocks to analyze 
the effect of spousal and survivors benefits on the labor supply of married couples. He 
extends a dynamic general-equilibrium OLG model with heterogeneous households 
and incomplete markets, calibrated to the 2009 U.S. economy, to study to what extent 
the spousal and survivors benefits possibly distort the joint labor supply decision of 
married households.  
 9 
 
In this paper, I build on the model of Nishiyama (2010). Compared with his paper, 
I focus on studying life insurance demand of married couples with heterogeneous 
households and partial market equilibrium. To the best of my knowledge, few papers 
has analyzed the effect of wage shocks and mortality shocks on the join life insurance 
holding decision of married households by using a heterogeneous-agent life cycle 
model.   
Specifically, I construct a heterogeneous-agent life cycle model of married 
households with market wages and mortality shocks to quantitatively analyze the life 
insurance demand for heterogeneous households. In the model, parents are both 
altruistic towards each other as well as towards their children. They choose optimal 
consumption, working hours, and life insurance purchases to maximize their expected 
lifetime utility. Here I introduce the number of children by ages calibrated by USA 
data into household characteristics. The dynamic model in this paper can further help 
explore the relation of a household’s life insurance demand to its specific household 
characteristics and the economic situation. Household characteristics in this paper can 
include the marital status, the number of children, mortality risk, household wealth, 
household income, household age, household risk attitude and so on.  
My model is to explore the impact of some factors in benchmark economy in the 
model on life insurance demand. First, the life insurance demand by household ages 
suggests that the most important determinants of life insurance demand are financial 
vulnerability, the amount of financial support needed and life insurance premium. I 
find that financial vulnerability is the primary determinant of life insurance demand in 
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a household during its early ages when the household has low wage earning and 
saving wealth; while life insurance premium is the primary determinant during its late 
ages when the household faces highest mortality risk. Second, the results show that 
the peak of life insurance demand for single-parent households is well before couple 
households. In addition, an increasing birth rate can attribute a large increase of life 
insurance demand in single-parent households, but has no significant influence on 
couple households. Finally, I discuss the joint decision of life insurance purchases 
between couples in couple households: if one receives a good wage shock, she/he will 
increase her/his labor time and life insurance coverage holding, but her/his spouse 
will decrease his/her labor time and life insurance coverage holding.  
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 develops the 
heterogeneous-agent life cycle model in detail. Section 2.3 is the model calibration to 
U.S. data. In Section 2.4, I show the main numerical results, and analyze how 
household characteristics and economic factors can affect the life insurance demand in 
a household. Section 2.5 provides conclusions and discussions. Algorithm 
methodology and optimization solutions for this life cycle model are present in 
Appendix 2A and Appendix 2B.  
 
2.2 Heterogeneous-Agent Life Cycle Model  
In this section, I build a heterogeneous-agent life cycle model to quantitatively derive 
the optimal decisions of life insurance holdings, consumption expenditures and labor 
time in a household. The focus is the optimal decision-making for life insurance 
 11 
 
purchases among heterogeneous households.  
 
2.2.1 Heterogeneous Households and Utility Functions 
The households in this model economy are heterogeneous with respect to several 
factors. One factor is household age, denoted by k = kmin, kmin+1…kmax. The 
household enters the economy when the husband’s age is over 20. For simplicity, I 
assume that the husband and the wife in a household are at the same age, and never 
get divorced.  
The number of children in each household is related to household age in the 
calibration. Note that the child in the model refers to an individual who is still 
younger than 20 years old. The wage rates per efficient unit of labor for each gender, 
w1 and w2, also vary at different household ages. In this model, the wage rate refers to 
the wage for one unit of labor hour and one unit of working ability. So one’s wage 
earning is the product of labor hours, wage rate per efficient unit of labor, and 
working ability.  
Two other heterogeneous factors are the husband’s and the wife’s working ability, 
denoted by e1 and e2 respectively, both of which are assumed to follow a Markov 
process and to be independent of each other. 
The parameter m has four values to specify four heterogeneous martial statuses 
among households: a married-couple household if m=0, a single-father household if 
m=1, a single-mother household if m=2, and a kids-only household if m=3. In this 
economy, I assume that all households are married couples at the very beginning. The 
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calibration of the marital status movement among heterogeneous households over the 
life cycle time is based on the mortality rate data.  
The beginning-of-period household wealth, a, is another heterogeneous factor. It 
changes according to the household optimal saving decision in last period, and the life 
insurance payment if the household marital status changes in last period. Here I 
should note that, compared with the beginning-of-period household wealth, ෤ܽ	 is the 
end-of-period wealth and denotes the optimal saving decision in the end of each 
period. In each period, it is determined by the net difference between household cash 
flow-in, including beginning-of-period household wealth, parents’ wage earnings if 
any, social security payment if any, and cash flow-out, including household 
consumption, and household life insurance purchasing cost if any.  
Therefore, we let s be the individual sate vector of a household in the model 
economy, s = (a, e1, e2, m, k).  
In this model economy, I assume the household’s utility function in each year to 
be a Cobb-Douglas and CRRA function, which depends on its current marital status m 
and the number of children n. I construct utility functions for heterogonous 
households by marital status as follows.  
First, utility functions of single-parent households (m=1 or m=2) are, 
Uሺc,	ll,;	n,	mൌ1ሻ	ൌ	 	 ൤	ቀ
೎
ሺభశ೙/మሻആ	ቁ
ഀ		ሺ௟భሻభషഀ	൨
భషം
ଵିఊ ,	
Uሺc,	l2;	n,	mൌ2ሻ	ൌ	 	 ൤	ቀ
೎
ሺభశ೙/మሻആ	ቁ
ഀ		ሺ௟మሻభషഀ	൨
భషം
ଵିఊ ,	
where c is household consumption at household age k; l1 is leisure time of the 
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husband, which is set to be 1 in the single-mother family; l2 is leisure time of the wife, 
which is set to be 1 in the single-father family; n is the number of children calibrated 
in this household year;		ߟ is the index of the economy scale between 0 and 1, and it 
implies that two-adult household spends 2η times as much as a one-adult household 
for the same level of living standard since I assume that the couple can share 
consumption expenditures; the child-adult equivalency factor is 1/2; the relative risk 
aversion is ߛ; α and (1-α) are elasticity of consumption and leisure time in the utility 
function. 
Then the following couple household’s utility function (m=0) is the sum of two 
utility functions above with a slight modification that the number of equivalent adults 
in a couple-household becomes (2+n/2), 
Uሺc,	l1,	l2;	n,	mൌ0ሻ	ൌ	 	 ൤	ቀ
೎
ሺమశ೙/మሻആ	ቁ
ഀ		ሺ௟భሻభషഀ	൨
భషം
ଵିఊ 	 	 	൅				
൤	ቀ ೎ሺమశ೙/మሻആ	ቁ
ഀ		ሺ௟మሻభషഀ	൨
భషം
ଵିఊ .	
Finally, the utility function of children-only households (m=3) is,   
Uሺc;	n,	mൌ3ሻ	ൌ n  ൤	ቀ
೎
೙/మ	ቁ
ഀ			൨
భషം
ଵିఊ , 
where the number of equivalent adults in a kids-only household becomes n/2; leisure 
time for mother and father are both set to be 1; and all consumption commodities are 
going to the children. Here I set the economy scale ߟ to be 1 since I assume that 
children do not share consumption commodities without parents’ custody. Then I sum 
up all equivalent adults’ utility to get total utility for the children-only household.  
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2.2.2 Household Optimization Problem of Expected Lifetime Utility 
In the model, household fund sources for each year are wags earnings, life insurance 
payments if any death and social security payments if any retirement, and funds are 
annually distributed into three categories: consumption expenditure, end-of-period 
wealth saved, and life insurance purchases. The household chooses the optimal 
decision path for each specific fund source and fund usage to maximize its expected 
utility over the lifetime. 
I assume that initial households are all married couples with some children at age 
20. In year k, each household receives working ability e1 for husband and e2 for wife, 
and faces mortality rates (1-φ1,k) for the husband and (1-φ2,k) for the wife. To 
maximize expected lifetime utility of a household, the adults will choose the 
following optimal decision rules together in each year: household consumption c, 
husband’s leisure time l1, wife’s leisure time l2, end-of-period saving wealth ෤ܽ , 
husband’s life insurance coverage d1 and wife’s life insurance coverage d2. In this 
model, d1 and d2 are viewed as life insurance demand of the husband’s and the wife’s. 
Here I assume that life insurance can be purchased at the actuarially fair cost.  
If a household happens to become a single-father household, the amount of the 
wife’s life insurance payment d2 will be added into the household saving wealth. The 
single-father will then choose the optimal decision rules each year to maximize 
household utility in the following life cycle time: household consumption c, 
end-of-period saving wealth	 ෤ܽ, his leisure time l2, and his life insurance coverage d1. 
The single-mother households in the model follow the same logic.  
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If a household becomes a kids-only household, the children will only choose the 
amount of household consumption and end-of-period saving wealth to maximize 
household utility.  
Let V(s) be value function of the household in individual state s. The optimization 
problem for the household in the life cycle model is as follows, 
Vk	ሺsሻ	ൌ	 ݉ܽݔ	ሾ	ܷሺܿ, ݈ଵ, ݈ଶ; 	݊௞,݉ሻ ൅ ߚ ׬ ௞ܸାଵሺsᇱሻ 		݀П௞ሺ݁ଵᇱ , ݁ଶᇱ ,݉ᇱ|݁ଵ, ݁ଶ,݉ሻሿ	
(1) Control variables’ constraints, 
c	൐	0;	
0	൏	l1	൑	1;	0	൏	l2	൑	1;	
d1	൒	0;	d2	൒	0;	
l1	ൌ1,	d1	ൌ0,	if	m	ൌ2	or	3;	
l2	ൌ1,	d2	ൌ0,	if	m	ൌ1	or	3.	
(2) The law of motion of household end-of-period wealth, 
 	 ෤ܽ	 ൌ	ሺ1൅rሻ	a	൅	w1,	k	e1	ሺ1‐l1ሻ	൅	w2,	k	e2	ሺ1‐l2ሻ	൅		ঌ௞வ଺ହ	ঌ௠ழଷ	
ሺ1൅ঌ௠ୀ଴ሻ	ss	–	c	–	ሺ1‐	φ1,kሻ	d1	–	ሺ1‐φ2,kሻ	d2.	
(3) The law of motion of household beginning-of-period wealth,  
	 	 aᇱൌ	 ෤ܽሺݏሻ൅	d1,	if	m	ൌ1	and	 ݉ᇱൌ3	or	m	ൌ0	and	 ݉ᇱൌ2;	
	 aᇱൌ	 ෤ܽሺݏሻ	൅	d2,	if	m	ൌ2	and	 ݉ᇱൌ3	or	m	ൌ0	and	 ݉ᇱൌ1;	
	 aᇱൌ	 ෤ܽሺݏሻ	൅	d1൅	d2,	if	m	ൌ0	and	 ݉ᇱൌ3;	
	 	 aᇱൌ	 ෤ܽሺݏሻ,	 otherwise.	
(4) The law of motion of household state variables, sᇱൌ	ሺaᇱ, ݁ଵᇱ , ݁ଶᇱ ,	 ݉ᇱ,	k൅1ሻ. 
Here, r is the interest rate; w1,k is husband’s wage rate per efficient unit of labor at 
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age k; w2,k is wife’s wage rate per efficient unit of labor at age k; ঌ௠ୀ଴	,		ঌ௞வ଺ହ and 
	ঌ௠ழଷ	are all indicator functions; ss is social security payment per person above 65 
years old; φ1,k is survival rate for the husband at the end of age k; φ2,k is survival rate 
for the wife at the end of age k;		П௞൫݁ଵ′ , ݁ଶ′ , ݉′ห݁ଵ, ݁ଶ,݉൯ is the transition probability 
function in the optimization, which will be calibrated in Section 2.3.  
 
2.2.3 Population Distribution and Aggregation 
For population aggregation, I construct the population distribution function for 
heterogeneous households in different states. One household sate includes wealth 
amount, husband/wife’s working ability, marital status and household age.  
  Let xሺsሻ	be the household population probability density function at age k, and 
let Xሺsሻ	 be the corresponding cumulative distribution function. The household 
population for each age is normalized to unity, 
∑ ׬ ݀ܺሺݏሻ஺∗ாమଷ௠ୀ଴ 	 ൌ	1,	where	s = (a, e1, e2, m, k) 
The law of motion of the household population distribution is as follows,  
xሺs’ሻds’	ൌ	 ∑ ׬ ૚	ሼ	ܽᇱ ൌ ܽᇱ ሺ ෤ܽ	ሺݏሻ, ݉′ሻ஺∗ாమଷ௠ୀ଴ ሽ ∗ 	П௞ሺ݁ଵᇱ , ݁ଶᇱ , ݉ᇱ|݁ଵ, ݁ଶ,݉ሻ ݀ܺሺݏሻ;	
where sᇱൌሺaᇱ,	݁ଵᇱ , ݁ଶᇱ ,	 ݉ᇱ,	k൅1ሻ.	
Then the aggregated values of the optimal wealth, consumption and life insurance 
demand by each household age for the whole population are as follows, 
Wk	ൌ	 ∑ 	׬ ܽሺݏሻ	݀ܺሺݏሻ஺∗ாమଷ௠ୀ଴ 	
Ck	ൌ	 ∑ 	׬ ܿሺݏሻ	݀ܺሺݏሻ஺∗ாమଷ	௠ୀ଴ 	
Dk	ൌ	 ∑ 	׬ ሾ݀ଵሺݏሻ ൅ ݀ଶሺݏሻሿ 	݀ܺሺݏሻ஺∗ாమଶ௠ୀ଴ 	
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2.3 Model Calibrations 
In this section, I calibrate the model to match pertinent U.S. data. My calibration 
addresses preference parameters, household demographic distribution and household 
income distribution. Note that the consistency of the wealth distribution with U.S. 
data is essential to the model. 
 
2.3.1 Main Preference Parameters 
Table 2.1: Main Preference Parameters 
         Parameters  Notations Values 
Interest rate r 0.05 
Time discount factor β 0.94; 
Share of consumption in utility α 0.36; 
Index of household scale economies η 0.678 
Coefficient of relative risk aversion γ 4.00 
The number of wealth nodes imax 20 
The number of wage shock nodes jmax 5 
The number of marital status types mmax 4 
Initial household age kmin 1   (Real age 20) 
Retirement age kr 45  (Real age 65) 
Maximum household ages kmax 80  (Real age 99) 
Social security payment ss $16,500 
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Table 2.1 is a list of the main economic parameters in this model. These parameter 
values are all consistent with either the economic literature or U.S. historical data. 
In addition, I assume that all households have the same number of children for 
each age. I use the average number of children estimated by Nishiyama (2010), which 
is calibrated from the data of fertility rates at mothers’ ages. Figure 2.1 shows the 
estimated average number of children by household ages in this paper. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: The Number of Children by Household Ages 
 
 
2.3.2 Marital Status Transition and Calibration 
For simplicity, I assume that both the husband’s working ability and the wife’s 
working ability in this life cycle model are independent of his/her mortality rate. Thus 
the state transition function for households can be obtained by the following formula, 
П௞ሺ݁ଵᇱ , ݁ଶᇱ ,݉ᇱ|݁ଵ, ݁ଶ,݉ሻ = П௞ሺ݉′ห݉ሻ	П (݁ଵᇱ	|݁ଵ) П	(݁ଶᇱ |݁ଶ) 
In this section, I focus on the marital status transition process and its calibration. 
All households are initially married couples. With certain probabilities and evolving 
 19 
 
paths, initial couple-households turn to be heterogeneous with different marital 
statuses over the life cycle time.  
To simply specify probabilities of marital status movement, I assume that the 
husband’s mortality rate and the wife’s mortality rate are independent of each other. 
Here, survival rates by ages are cited from Table 4 of the 2010 Annual Statistical 
Supplement of the Social Security Administration. The household marital status 
transition probability matrix from state m at age k to state m’ at age (k+1) is 
П௞ሺ݉′|݉ሻ. Then we have, 
	 	 	 	 	 φ1,k	φ2,k	 	 	 	 φ1,k	ሺ1‐φ2,kሻ	 	 	 	 	 ሺ1‐	φ1,kሻ	φ2,k	 	 	 ሺ1‐	φ1,kሻ	ሺ1‐φ2,kሻ	
П௞ሺ݉ᇱ|݉ሻൌ	 	 	 	 0	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 φ1,k	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 1‐	φ1,k	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 φ2,k	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 1‐φ2,k	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 1	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
Figure 2.2: Population Distribution with Marital Status by Ages 
Figure 2.2 shows the population distribution with respect to marital status 
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calibrated in the model. 
 
2.3.3 Working Ability Transition and Wage Rate Calibration 
As I mentioned in Section 2.2.1, one’s wage earning is the product of working ability, 
wage rate, and labor hours. In this section, I build up the working ability transition 
process for both husbands and wives, and also calibrate the wage rate by ages for two 
genders by U.S. data.  
With idiosyncratic wage shocks for each household state, wage earners have 
access to different levels of working ability in the model. The motions of the 
husband’s working ability e1 and the wife’s working ability e2 are both assumed to 
follow Markov chains, and these two stochastic processes are independent of each 
other. The stochastic processes of e1 and e2 are as follows,  
ln	e1,j൅1	ൌ	ln	e1,j	 	 ൅	z1,j൅1	 	
ln	z1,j൅1	ൌ	 	 ρ	z1,j	 	 ൅	ε1,j൅1  where	ε1,j	~	Nሺ0,	 ߪଵଶሻ	
ln	e2,j൅1	ൌ	 	 ln	e2,j	൅	z2,j൅1	
ln	z2,j൅1	ൌ	 	 ρ	z2,j	 	 ൅ε2,j൅1  where	ε2,j	~	Nሺ0,	 ߪଶଶሻ	
               where z1 and	z2	 	 are persistent wage shocks of men and women. 
Nishiyama (2010) calibrates the income distribution for men and women by 
estimating these parameters above, which is consistent with the data from weekly 
earnings in CPS7. This numerical approximation yields the vector of persistent wage 
shock nodes and the Markov working-ability transition probability matrix for each 
                                                              
7  Current Population Survey  
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gender as follows, 
z1 = [0.3103, 0.5801, 1.0000, 1.7240, 3.2229] ; 
z2 = [0.3322, 0.5988, 1.0000, 1.6701, 3.0099] ; 
 
                       0.8979  0.1021  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
                       0.0308  0.8902  0.0790  0.0000  0.0000 
Пሺ݁ଵᇱ	|݁ଵሻ	ൌ	 Пሺ݁ଶᇱ	|݁ଶሻ	ൌ	 	  0.0000  0.0518  0.8964  0.0518  0.0000	
                       0.0000  0.0000  0.0790  0.8902  0.0308 
                       0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.1021  0.8979   
Using the data of 2009 weekly earnings in CPS, first of all, I calibrate median 
wage rates for both husband and wife from age 21 to 65. Here one is assumed to retire 
at age 65. The data shows that the median annual wage earning of a full-time 
employee for both genders is $739  52. Correspondingly in this model, median 
annual income is the product of benchmark wage rate per efficient unit of labor, 
median labor hours, and median working ability (1.0000). I assume that median labor 
time is 1/3 out of 1. So the benchmark wage rate in this economy should be wഥ  = 
$ (739  52)/ [(1/3)  1.0000] = $1.15284  105.  
Then I calculate the wage rate for each gender at each age by multiplying the 
benchmark wage rate wഥ  and the ratio of his/her median weekly wage at each age to 
the median full-time employee’s weekly wage ($739). Figure 2.3 shows original and 
OLS-adjusted wage rates for both husband and wife over the life cycle time. 
 22 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Wage Rates by Ages and Genders 
Note that I cannot obtain the upper tail of the income distribution and wealth 
distribution in the model economy since the working ability transition probability 
function cannot produce a quite high income. Except the upper tail, both of the 
income distribution and the wealth distribution by ages calibrated in the model are 
consistent with U.S. data.  
 
2.4 Household Life Insurance Demand Results and Analysis  
In this section, I show the numerical results of the Heterogeneous-Agent Life Cycle 
model economy, and explore the determinants of life insurance holdings for 
heterogeneous households. I also analyze the impact of some factors in benchmark 
economy in the model on life insurance demand. 
Figure 2.4 shows the peak of life insurance demand in our model is around 
$370,000 occurring at age 33, and the demand begins decreasing rapidly after age 54 
by more than 10% per year.  
 23 
 
The life insurance demand in the model is higher than observed data in Chamber, 
Schlagenhauf, and Young (2003). First, I assume that all households initially are 
married couples, which can increase overall life insurance holdings since a single 
household should have relatively less life insurance demand.  
 
Figure 2.4: Household Life Insurance Demand for Aggregate Population 
Second, the wage calibration is based on the income data of full-time employee in 
2009. This attributes a higher median value of wage earning than their data, and thus a 
higher amount of life insurance purchases. 
Third, savings in the model are smaller than their data, so households tend to 
purchase more life insurance to protect their financial security. I have the two 
following reasons. Considering that the wealth distribution in the real world is skewed, 
I calibrate the wealth distribution using the median value of household net worth in 
2007 from SCF instead of the mean value. The fact that the median value of net worth 
is less than the mean value leads to a smaller amount of saving wealth calibrated in 
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my model than the survey data. Additionally, the upper tail of the wealth distribution 
cannot be calibrated due to the limit of my model.  
Finally, the risk aversion coefficient is consistently equal to a high level of 4.0 
over the lifetime in my model, which may push life insurance demand up. If I change 
the coefficient of risk aversion to the same value (1.5) as Chambers, Schlagenhauf, 
and Young (2009), the peak of life insurance holding decreases to $320,000 occurring 
household age 37.  
 
Figure 2.5: Household Life Insurance Demand with Gamma being 1.5 
Figure 2.5 provides life insurance demand with a low risk aversion, 1.5. The 
results are smaller than the theoretical estimation in Chambers, Schlagenhauf, and 
Young (2009) and fit their observed data in 2003 better. However, in this way, there is 
no consistence of the calibrated wealth distribution in the model with the U.S. 
household net worth data in 2007.  
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2.4.1 Household Age 
Figure 2.4 shows the life insurance demand by household ages. During early ages 
from 20 to 30, households hold a relatively small amount of wealth and have 
relatively low earnings, and have an increasing number of children. They tend to save 
money and purchase a high level of life insurance holdings to provide financial 
security. On one hand, households continually increase life insurance purchases to 
satisfy their increasing financial support needed. On the other hand, wage earners of 
young households have the lowest mortality risk, so households choose to purchase 
high but not the highest life insurance coverage despite of quite a low life insurance 
premium.  
From age 31 to 40, households have the largest number of children and need a 
large amount of financial support from both saving wealth and life insurance 
purchases. Therefore, households keep purchasing high life insurance coverage to 
hedge mortality risk and wage shocks, and continue to save a lot to increase economic 
strength. The peak of life insurance holdings occurs at age 33. Since the number of 
children begins to decrease from age 37, life insurance holdings starts decreasing by 
less than 3% per year in the late of this period.  
From age 40 to 54, the number of children in a household continues to decrease 
and wealth is continuously accumulated. Households decrease life insurance 
purchases by between 3% and 10% per year. Figure 2.5 shows there is a much larger 
chance for people above 55 years old to die than those below 55, and mortality rates 
quickly increase after age 55. However, from age 55 to 65, households have almost no 
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children and possess the largest amount of wealth to provide financial security. 
Considering life insurance premium is much more expensive for them than before, 
they largely decrease life insurance purchases by above 10% per year as a result.  
The age distribution of life insurance holdings in the model suggests that the 
avoidance of financial vulnerability due to mortality shocks and wage shocks, the 
amount of financial support needed and the life insurance premium are the most 
important determinants of life insurance demand.  
 
2.4.2 Mortality Shock 
Figure 2.6 shows that life insurance demand greatly changes when I decline survival 
rates by 5%8 in the model. In this case, the household is not able to earn as much 
money as in the benchmark economy, and household consumption and welfare are 
both dropping considerably.  
 
Figure 2.6: Household Life Insurance Demand with Lower Survival Rates 
                                                              
8  Although it is unrealistic that the survival rate can be reduced by 5%, I test it to examine the impact of a 
mortality shock on life insurance demand. 
 
 27 
 
In spite of a low income, households during early ages save much more money 
than in the benchmark economy, and purchase more life insurance coverage to 
provide financial security to protect households from the increased mortality risk. In 
contrast, households tend to have significantly less life insurance holdings than in the 
benchmark economy during late ages due to much higher life insurance premium. 
 
Figure 2.7: Life Insurance Demand by Genders with Lower Survival Rates 
Figure 2.7 further provides the changes in the life insurance demand for each 
gender. I notice that the wife’s life insurance holdings during early ages jump 
extraordinarily so as to hedge greater financial risk due to her higher death probability. 
I can also notice a large decrease of life insurance holdings for husbands among old 
households due to the much higher insurance premium.  
Based on the fact that survival rate for the wife is higher than for the husband in 
each household year, I can strengthen our inference that the avoidance of financial 
vulnerability is the dominating factor of life insurance purchases during household 
early ages and instead life insurance premiums are the dominating concern during 
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household late ages.  
 
2.4.3 Household Marital Status 
Figure 2.8 shows life insurance demands with respect to the different situations of 
marital status. Couple households follow the same tendency of life insurance demand 
movement as the whole population.  
My results show a slightly different situation for single-parent households. The 
single-parent household tends to save much more than couple households at the very 
early ages to avoid potentially high financial vulnerability due to the last adult’s death. 
However, the peak of life insurance purchases for single-parent households (around 
age 28) is well before couple households (at age 33) since the amount of financial 
support needed for single-parent households afterwards is smaller than that of couple 
households as the number of children decreases with household ages. 
 
Figure 2.8: Household Life Insurance Demand by Martial Status 
 
 29 
 
2.4.4 The Number of Children  
Figure 2.9 shows the impact of the number of children in a household on life 
insurance demand. Compared to a slight increase in couple household’s life insurance 
purchases with the increasing number of children, there is a big jump of life insurance 
holdings for the single-parent households.  
The results show that raising the number of children in each household by 10% 
leads to 12.8% higher life insurance demand of single-father households and even 
15.6% higher life insurance demand of single-mother households. However, the life 
insurance demand of couple households increases only by 1.6% in this case. The 
results suggest that increasing the number of children attributes a high increase of life 
insurance demand in single-parent households, but has no significant influence on 
couple households. 
 
Figure 2.9: Household Life Insurance Demand with More Children 
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2.4.5 Household Income and Wealth 
Figure 2.10 shows the relationship between the husband’s life insurance demand and 
household wealth and his working ability at age 39. When the husband’s working 
ability becomes higher, his life insurance demand is increased which can provides 
stronger financial security in order to guarantee that remaining household members 
are able to keep the same level of living standard before and after his death.  
Figure 2.11 shows the husband’s life insurance demand is reduced when the wife’s 
working ability is higher. It is because of his prediction of less financial risk after his 
death. 
 
Figure 2.10: Husband’s Life Insurance Demand in Couple Households by 
             Household Wealth and His Working Ability at Age 39 
 
For the aggregate population, Figure 2.12 illustrates the simulation results of the 
joint decision of life insurance purchases between couples in couple-households. It 
implies that the more important wage earner holds higher life insurance coverage. It 
shows that with the wife’s working ability increasing by 5%, the husband’s life 
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insurance demand reduces on average by 4.7% and the wife’s life insurance demand 
grows up by 9.5%. Therefore, if one wage-earner receives a good wage shock, she/he 
will increase her/his working hours and life insurance coverage, and her/his spouse 
will decreases his/her working hours and life insurance coverage to maximize 
household utility. 
 
Figure 2.11: Husband’s Life Insurance Demand in Couple Households by        
          Household Wealth and His Wife’s Working Ability at Age 39 
 
 
Figure 2.12: Life Insurance Demand with a Higher Wife’s Working Ability 
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2.4.6 Household Welfare  
Figure 2.13 shows couple household’s welfare at age 39. It implies that household 
welfare is increasing with working ability increasing and wealth rising.  
 
Figure 2.13: Couple-Household Welfare by Wealth and Working Ability at 39 
 
2.5 Conclusions and Discussions 
In this paper, I construct a heterogeneous-agent life cycle model with market wage 
shocks and mortality shocks to explore the relation of a household’s life insurance 
demand to its specific household characteristics and the economic situation. The 
dynamic model and its calibration are discussed and the optimal decisions of saving 
wealth and life insurance purchases among heterogeneous households are found by 
numerical approximation.  
I discuss the impact of mortality shocks, marital status, the number of children, 
and wage shocks on life insurance holdings among heterogeneous households. The 
results suggest that the most important determinants of life insurance demand are 
 33 
 
financial vulnerability, the amount of financial support needed and the level of life 
insurance premium. More importantly, this paper provides one way to simulate the 
join decision of life insurance purchases between married couples and show risk 
sharing within a household.  
The results in this chapter show us the same puzzle as Chambers, Schlagenhauf, 
and Young (2009) do, that the peak of that in the model economy is occurring much 
earlier than their observed data from SCF in 2003, and that the simulated amount is 
larger than their empirical study in 2003, although I obtain smaller results than them. 
This comes up with several interesting questions to explore: whether the U.S. 
households underinsured or not, whether people are rational or not towards household 
financial products, and what kind of factors can bridge the gap between empirical 
research and theoretical model in studying the life insurance demand.  
In future research, it is worth matching this heterogeneous household life cycle 
model economy more exactly with the recent SCF data economy, which can make the 
simulation result more convincing and the comparison result more useful. I will focus 
on examining the demographic distribution, income distribution, wealth holdings and 
life insurance holdings in data economy, and also improving the calibration to match 
the observed data. In addition, I will try to introduce funeral cost, annuities, divorce 
and remarriage into the model economy in order to find a way to perform the 
matching experiment. I also aim to conduct sensitivity analysis to explore the impact 
of some other factors on life insurance holdings, such as risk attitude, social security 
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payment, interest rate, annuities holdings, divorce rate and remarriage rate. It is also 
interesting to examine the change of household welfare by dismissing life insurance 
holdings in the model. 
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3	
	
A Two-Period Cash Flow Model with 
Catastrophic Risk  
 
In the property-liability insurance market, sharp price increases and large capacity 
swings follow catastrophic loss shocks. Taking Hurricane Katrina (2005) 9  for 
instance, some insurance companies stopped insuring homeowners in the disaster area 
because of the high costs from Hurricanes Katrina, or raised homeowners' insurance 
premiums to cover their risk.  
At the firm level, after a catastrophe event, insurers turn out to have different 
post-catastrophe performances. For example, eleven property/casualty insurers 10 
became insolvent resulting from Hurricane Andrew (1992). Some of the state’s largest 
homeowners insurers had to obtain resources from their parent companies and others 
had to use their surplus to pay Hurricane Andrew claims. Allstate, as an example, paid 
out $1.9 billion, $500 million more than it had made in profits from its Florida 
                                                              
9  Hurricane Katrina, the fourth catastrophe, is not only the most expensive natural disaster on record but also an 
event that intensified discussion nationwide about the way natural and man-made disasters are managed. 
10  Ten in Florida and one in Louisiana. 
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operations from all types of insurance and investment income on those funds over the 
53 years it had been in business.11  
With the possibility of more frequent and severe catastrophe events, it is important 
to understand how insurers and the insurance market respond. In this paper, I study an 
insurer’s optimal strategy in a two-period cash flow model with capacity constraints 
and without capacity constraints, given the possibility of catastrophic shocks. I further 
analyze how catastrophic shocks can affect the industrial organization of the 
property-liability insurance market by examining the insurers’ post-catastrophe 
performance.  
The model contributes by suggesting that the insurer has an optimal capital 
structure in a world where capital is costly. Further, the firm’s solvency ratio plays an 
important role in the interaction between its ability to sell new business and to raise 
external capital. I find that the insurer’s supply capacity is decreased and the external 
capital shrinks due to capacity constraints after catastrophic shocks.  
I also find that one catastrophic event could act as an accelerated trigger, splitting 
insurers into high-quality ones and low-quality ones with respect to different 
underwriting efficiencies and capital raising abilities. I claim that a well-capitalized 
insurer could have advantages in both the ability to sell new business and the ability 
to raise external capital. Such an insurer may even gain additional profit when it can 
take advantage of the insurance price increase and the insured’s loyalty after 
catastrophic shocks. 
                                                              
11  “Catastrophes: Insurance Issues”, Insurance Matters, May 2013. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Both the Capacity Constraint Theory (Winter, 1988; Gron, 1994) and the related Risk 
Over Hang Theory (Gron and Winton 2001) suggest that sharp price increases and 
large capacity swings will follow a capital shock, such as those caused by a large 
natural disaster or a significant macro economic event. This is, in part, due to 
relatively high capital adjustment costs (see Winter 1988, 1991; Gron, 1994). In the 
property-liability insurance market, the mismatch between an unexpected catastrophe 
loss and loss reserves could cause a capital shortfall and a premium increase for the 
entire insurance industry (see Gron 1994; Gron and Winton 2001; Cummins and Nini, 
2002; Doherty, Lamm-Tennant, and Stark, 2003).  
To examine the effect of catastrophe events on the insurance industry, it is 
essential to understand how insurers and the insurance market respond to catastrophic 
shocks in different environments.  
One can imagine that, once a catastrophe occurs, the demand expansion and the 
supply reduction turn out to cause premiums to grow sharply and then gradually 
moderate as the insurance industry becomes sufficiently recapitalized. During this 
process, insurers with a comparative advantage in intermediating catastrophic risks 
may take advantage of the market price increase and relatively low cost of external 
capital, while other insurers may encounter insolvency or significant financial stress 
resulting from capital insufficiency. Further, one catastrophic event could act as 
trigger, splitting insurers into high-quality ones and low-quality ones with respect to 
different underwriting efficiencies and capital raising capabilities. Meanwhile, new 
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investors, who would supply capital to incumbent insurers and new insurers, may 
enter the insurance market after the event. With incumbent insurers categorized by 
their ability to withstand serial catastrophes and new comers continually entering into 
the market, changes in the insurance industry are sequentially occurring.  
In this paper, I construct a two-period cash flow model with catastrophic risk for 
an insurer in order to find whether and how catastrophic shocks can influence 
insurance prices and the industrial organization in the property-liability insurance 
market. The focus of the model is to understand how a catastrophe event can affect 
the insurer’s underwriting decision and capital structure with capacity constraints.  
I find the profit-maximizing insurer has an optimal capital structure in an 
environment with costly capital. The model suggests that in the situation of a tight 
capital supply and high insurance demand, a positive relationship between 
catastrophic losses and insurance prices and the negative relationship between losses 
and insurance coverage capacity can be observed.  
The two-period model contributes by showing that the insurer’s solvency ratio 
plays an important role in the interaction between the insurer’s balance sheet and 
external capital rationing. I also find that the insurer with a good solvency position 
prior to the shock could obtain advantageous position in both the ability to sell new 
business and the ability to raise external capital. This indicates that the difference 
between good and bad insurers will be larger with more volatile catastrophes. In the 
future, I also quantitatively derive the condition in which the insurer can benefit from 
underwriting catastrophic risk.  
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This chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 is literature review. Section 3.3 
develops a two-period cash flow model with catastrophic risk for an insurer. In section 
3.4, I solve the model and also analyze the insurer’s optimal catastrophic risk 
intermediation strategy in two different cases: without capacity constraints and with 
capacity constraints. In section 3.5, I show some implications developed from this 
model for a potential empirical study. Section 3.6 provides conclusions and 
discussions.  
 
3.2 Literature Review 
By the Capacity Constraint Theory and the related Risk Over Hang Theory, the 
short-run insurance industry’s supply curve is upward sloping when a capacity 
constraint becomes binding, and that it is costly for insurers to raise new capital 
immediately following a negative capital shock because of agency and bankruptcy 
costs. Negative shocks to claims or industry capital can substantially reduce industry 
capacity, shifting the supply curve to the left to push up the price (see Winter, 1988, 
1991, 1994; Gron, 1994).  
In the literature, many papers provide support for some of the findings of the 
Capacity Constraint Theory in the property-liability insurance industry. Several 
studies have found that unanticipated decreases in the insurance industry capacity can 
cause higher profitability and prices (see Winter 1988, 1994; Gron, 1994; Doherty and 
Garven, 1995). Grace and Hotchkiss (1995) show the great effects of shocks to the 
general economic variables on the insurance underwriting performances measured by 
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profitability. Doherty, Lamm-Tennant, and Starks (2003) check the temporal and cross 
sectional variation in insurance company stock prices after 9/11, and find insurers 
suffering the lowest losses with less leverage were able to exploit the post-loss hard 
market. This implies that insurers could make profit if they can develop a successful 
catastrophic risk intermediation strategy. Grace and Klein (2009) indicate that insurers 
have substantially raised insurance rates and reduced their exposures after the intense 
hurricane seasons of 2004 and 2005, and that there has been substantial market 
restructuring in Florida but significantly less so in other states. This is really due to 
the fact that Florida’s market is subject to many more shocks than other markets. They 
also show the evidence that catastrophes can influence the insurance industrial 
organization. 
Researchers have also built models to study the relationship between shocks and 
capitalization. Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) develop a portfolio model of 
corporate risk management to show that capital-market imperfections can make 
risk-neutral insurers appear to be risk averse and to be more risk averse if there is a 
negative shock to internal capital. This portfolio model is extended to research shocks 
in the insurance industry. Gron and Winton (2001), for example, conclude that 
nonlife-insurers will reduce their willingness to engage in correlated business 
activities when past risks cannot be easily diversified or hedged. This kind of model 
suggests that negative shocks to capital can decrease the industry capacity.  
Cagle and Harrington (1995) and Cummins and Danzon (1997) both develop cash 
flow models to predict an ambiguous relationship between the insurance price and a 
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loss shock based on different assumptions about the effects of shocks on demand 
elasticity (also see Grace, Klein and Kleindorfer, 2004). Specifically, the model of 
Cagle and Harrington (1995) is a one-period cash flow model for the insurance 
market equilibrium with the costly capital market assumption. Cummins and Danzon 
(1997) build a two-period risky debt model for an insurer with new equity 
endogenously issued in the second period. In their model, the costly capital market 
and the capacity constraint are not emphasized.  
In this paper, I extend these two models into a two-period cash flow model with 
catastrophic risk for an insurer by involving both a reinsurance market and an external 
capital market. In this model, I aim to study the impact of catastrophic shocks on the 
insurer’s next-period optimal strategic choices of the underwriting capacity quantity 
and the capital structure under different environments of financial markets.  
 
3.3 Two-Period Cash Flow Model with Catastrophe Risk  
 
Figure 3.1: Time Line of the Two-Period Cash Flow Model for an Insurer 
In this section, I develop a two-period cash flow model with one catastrophic event 
for an insurer to explore the insurer’s optimal catastrophe risk intermediation strategy.  
In this two-period model, the insurer originally has retained earnings e0 as initial 
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endowment, and one catastrophe event occurs during the first period. Figure 3.1 
shows the time line in this model.  
At the beginning of each of these two periods, the insurer collects annual premium 
πQ from the insured, where π is the insurance premium per unit of coverage and Q is 
the total insurance coverage. I assume that the premium π is exogenously determined 
in the first period, and the insurer chooses its optimal post-catastrophe premium in the 
second period.  
The insurer also raises external capital. Here I treat external capital as one-period 
debt, which is issued by the insurer at an amount of e at the beginning of each period 
and is repaid with a total amount of external capital cost, R, at the end of the period. In 
the real world, the insurer can raise the capital both from debt holders with interest 
cost and equity holders with agency cost and adjustment cost. Here I use debt holders 
instead of equity holders because it is easy to calculate the cost of the capital in each 
period. 
Meanwhile, the insurer purchases reinsurance coverage of βQ, where β is the ratio 
of reinsurance coverage to the total coverage, and C denotes the reinsurance premium 
per unit of reinsurance coverage. Here β is between 0 and 1, and β = 0 means no 
reinsurance while β = 1 means full reinsurance.  
At the end of each period, the insurer indemnifies the insured for covered losses 
lQ and receives the reimbursement of βlQ from the reinsurer. Here l can be viewed as  
unit loss that is the loss incurred per dollar insured. We can denote L = lQ as the loss 
incurred. At the same time, the insurer repays the due debt R back to external capital 
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holders.  
In this model, the insured event occurring during the first period can cause 
different levels of losses: liQ with probability of ܲ௜, and li < lj, if i < j, where i, j = 1, 
2, … I. Here li is the loss incurred per dollar insured in case i. I assume that the 
expected value of loss incurred is equal to the total insurance coverage, ∑ ܲ௜݈௜ூ௜ୀଵ Q = 
Q. Correspondingly, each economic variable in the second period would have different 
states with superscript “i”. Here we can also denote Li = liQ as the total loss incurred 
in case i. If we set ܮത to be the threshold for the amount of catastrophic loss, a 
catastrophe event in this paper could refer to the event, whose loss, Li, is more than ܮത.  
In this model, b is defined as the ratio of assets to liabilities, and I also refer to it as 
the solvency ratio. If b is equal to or more than 1, the insurer is solvent. Here, b 
impacts the insurance coverage Q, the external capital cost R, and the reinsurance 
premium C. Let bi denote the same ratio for each state i in the second period. Similarly, 
Qi , Ri, Ci, ei, and βi all denote the same economic variables as previous ones for each 
state in the second period. Thus bi should have impact on Qi , Ri, Ci, ei, and βi in the 
second period. 
I also make assumptions with regards to the following functions. I assume that the 
insured will purchase more insurance with a lower premium ߨ and a higher solvency 
ratio b. Therefore, the demand function for insurance coverage Q(ߨ, ܾሻ is a concave 
function with ܳగ ൏ 0, ܳగగ 	൏ 	0, 	ܳ௕	 ൐ 0, 		ܳ௕௕ 	൏ 	0, where subscripts are used to 
denote partial derivatives. The cost function of reinsurance per unit of coverage C(b) 
is a convex function with ܥ௕	 ൏ 0, 	ܥ௕௕ 	൐ 0. My basic assumption here is that the 
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reinsurance premium will increase as the insurer has a lower solvency ratio, and it 
increases at an increasing rate (see Froot, 2001). The cost function of external capital 
ܴሺ݁, ܾሻ	 is a convex function with ܴ௘  ൐  0, ܴ௘௘ 	൐ 	0, 	ܴ௕	 ൏ 0, ܴ௕௕ 	൐ 	0 . 
Considering deadweight costs should be an increasing function of the amount of 
external capital, I assume that R will go up, at an increasing rate, as the insurer issues 
a larger amount of debt e. I also assume that issuing debt will be more costly when the 
insurer becomes more likely to be insolvent, and it changes at an increasing rate. 
Then the insurer’s expected cash flow in the first period should be expressed by 
{e0 + [π - C(b)β - (1-β)∑ ܲ௜݈௜ூ௜ୀଵ rf-1]Q(π,b) + e – R(b, e)rf-1}, where rf is the risk-free 
rate. In the second period, the cash flow of state i in this model economy should be 
{[πi – Ci(bi) βi - (1-βi) rf-1] Qi(πi, bi) + ei – Ri(bi, ei)rf-1}. To maximize the profit within 
two periods, the insurer would choose the optimal amount of external capital {e, ei} 
and reinsurance ratio { β, βi} for each state i in both of these two periods, and set up 
the optimal premium {πi} for each state i in the second period. The optimization 
problem of the profit for the insurer in this model is as follows, 
   Max Profit  = e0 + [π - C(b)β - (1-β)∑ P୧l୧୧୍ୀଵ rf-1]Q(π,b) + e – R(b, e)rf-1 
{e, ei, β, βi,πi}   + rf-1∑ P୧୧୍ୀଵ {[πi – Ci(bi) βi - (1-βi) rf-1]Qi(πi, bi) + ei – Ri(bi, ei)rf-1}                 
s.t.  
                b = 	ୣబାሺ	஠ିେஒሻ୕ା	ୣିୖ௥೑
షభ
ሺଵିஒሻ୕௥೑షభ
	 
                bi = 
ൣ௥೑ሺ஠ିେஒሻ୕ିሺଵିஒሻ୐౟൧ାൣ௥೑ሺୣబାୣሻିୖ൧ାሾ൫஠౟ିେ౟ஒ౟൯୕౟ାሺୣ౟ିୖ౟௥೑షభሻሿ
ሺଵିஒ౟ሻ୕౟௥೑షభ
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3.4 The Insurer’s Optimal Strategy Analysis 
In this section, I discuss the optimization solutions for the model in two different cases: 
we want to look at the insurer’s choices of catastrophic risk intermediation strategy in 
the costly external capital market, but let us look at the risk free capital market at first. 
 
3.4.1 Case One: Risk Free Capital Market 
In the first case I examine, the cost of capital is assumed to be equal to the risk free 
rate. Thus conditions (3.1) and (3.2) below will hold in risk free capital market for the 
marginal cost of reinsurance and external capital.  
C(b) = Ci (bi) = ݎ௙ି ଵ                                                 (3.1) 
R(b,e)= Ri (bi, ei) = rf                                                (3.2) 
These two conditions imply that the insurer can choose any reinsurance ratio βi 
between 0 and 1 and raise any feasible external capital ei from external capital owners 
without any extra charge. In other words, there is no need for the insurer to reserve 
funds to prepare for future loss payments. Based on the First Order Conditions (FOCs) 
and the comparative statics analysis of the optimization problem under these two 
conditions, the following results can be obtained: 
ܳ௕ ൌ ܥ௕ ൌ ܴ௕ ൌ ܳ௕೔௜ ൌ ܥ௕೔௜ ൌ ܴ௕೔௜  = 0                                  (3.3)  
ܧொ೔గ೔ ൌ 	െ గ
೔
గ೔ି௥೑షభ
					                                                 (3.4) 
Equation (3.3) describes the fact that the solvency ratio of the insurer, b, has no 
impact on the insurance demand Q, the reinsurance cost C, or the external capital cost 
R, because the insurer can always raise revenues as high as it needs with no extra risk 
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charge.  
Equation (3.4) is the price elasticity of insurance demand in each state during the 
second period. It implies that the second-period premium of the insurer will be 
determined by its specific price elasticity in each state, and has nothing to do with the 
previous loss payment.  
All in all, in a risk free economy, the insurer’s solvency position does not matter 
and a catastrophic shock has no effect on the insurer’s underwriting and capital 
structure. In such a situation, neither the Capacity Constraint Theory nor the Risk 
Over Hang Theory has any effect at all.  
 
3.4.2 Case Two: Costly Capital Market 
The second case I examine assumes the capital is costly. When the marginal cost of 
capital is greater than the risk-free rate, the conditions (3.1) and (3.2) should be 
changed into inequities (3.5) and (3.6) such that,  
C(b), Ci (bi) >ݎ௙ି ଵ                                                   (3.5)  
R(b,e), Ri (bi, ei) > rf                                                 (3.6) 
In this case, the insurer tends to choose an optimal intermediation strategy to reserve 
funds to make preparations for expected future loss payments. From the FOCs and the 
Comparative Statics Analysis of the optimization problem, I can obtain the following 
results with regards to the optimal catastrophic risk intermediation strategy. Note that 
Ti = πi- Ciβi -(1- βi)rf-1 and i < j for all the equations below.  
ܯ ௕ܲ௜ ൌ 	 డ	௉௥௢௙௜௧డ	௕೔  = Tiܳ௕೔௜ െ βiQiܥ௕೔௜ െ ݎ௙ି ଵܴ௕೔௜ ;                            (3.7) 
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Equation (3.7) is the insurer’s marginal profit with respect to its solvency ratio in 
state i, denoted by ܯ ௕ܲ௜ . Note that this marginal profit will be increased if the insurer 
has a better solvency position in this model, and this is because, in this model, 
consumers are willing to purchase insurance from more secure insurers.  
ܯ ௕ܲ௜ ൌ െ
ொ೔ା்೔ொഏ೔
೔
௕ഏ೔೔
 = 
ሺ஼೔ି௥೑షభሻொ೔
௕ഁ೔೔
 = 
௥೑షభோ೐೔
೔ ିଵ
௕೐೔೔
	;                            (3.8.1) 
Equation (3.8.1) shows the equilibrium of these three markets in such an economy: 
the primary insurance market, the reinsurance market and the external capital market. 
It implies that the insurer’s solvency position plays an important role in the interaction 
between the ability to sell new business and the ability to raise capital. I also claim 
that the insurer with a good solvency position could have relatively high marginal 
profit, ܯ ௕ܲ௜ , and thus obtain advantages in both the ability to sell new business and 
the ability to raise external capital.  
ܯ గܲ௜ ൌ 	ܯ ௕ܲ௜ 	ܾగ೔௜ ൌ െ	ܳ௜ െ ܶ௜ܳగ೔௜ 	;                                    (3.8.2) 
ܯ ఉܲ௜ ൌ 	ܯ ௕ܲ௜ 	 ఉܾ೔௜ ൌ 	 ሺܥ௜ െ ݎ௙ି ଵሻܳ௜;			                                   (3.8.3) 
ܯ ௘ܲ௜ ൌ 	ܯ ௕ܲ௜ 	ܾ௘೔௜ ൌ ݎ௙ି ଵܴ௘೔௜ െ 	1;                                      (3.8.4) 
Equation (3.8.1) to (3.8.4) show that the insurer has an optimal capital structure in 
costly capital economy. Specifically, Equation (3.8.2) shows that the marginal profit 
with respect to the insurance premium, 	ܯ గܲ௜, is equal to the marginal cost of setting 
up the premium πi in the second period, which is െ	ܳ௜ െ ܶ௜ܳగ೔௜ . Equation (3.8.3) 
states that the optimal βi is the reinsurance ratio when the marginal cost of purchasing 
such reinsurance, ሺܥ௜ െ ݎ௙ି ଵሻܳ௜, is equal to the marginal profit of reinsurance ܯ ఉܲ௜ . 
In addition, Equation (3.8.4) implies that the optimal ei is the amount of external 
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capital when the marginal cost of raising such capital, ݎ௙ି ଵܴ௘೔௜ െ 1, is equal to the 
marginal profit of external capital ܯ ௘ܲ௜. 
ௗగ೔
ௗ௅೔ ൌ
ఉ೔஼್೔
೔ ொഏ೔
೔ ିሺொ್೔
೔ ା்೔ொഏ೔್೔
೔ ା௕ഏ೔
೔ ெ௉್ ೔೔ ሻ
|ௌை஼|∗	|௕ಽ೔೔
షభ| 	;                                     (3.9)  
Equation (3.9) describes the effect of losses in the last period on the next-period 
insurance price, the sign of which is determined by cross partial derivative ܳగ೔௕೔௜  and 
the first derivative of the solvency ratio with respect to premium ܾగ೔௜ . Firstly, let us 
assume ܥ௕೔௜  = 0 in order to check the sign in a simple way. If the insurance demand 
becomes more price elastic in response to a lower solvency ratio, with	ܳగ೔௕೔௜  and ܾగ೔௜  
being both positive, the effect of losses on premium will be negative. This situation 
can be plausible when people turn to buy other available insurance products at the 
same cost from insurers with higher solvency prospects, or when people make use of 
other effective mechanisms to mitigate risks rather than purchase insurance.  
If ܳగ೔௕೔௜  is negative, which means the insurance price elasticity of demand will be 
lower in response to a lower solvency ratio, the relationship between previous losses 
and future premiums can be positive. This situation can be valid when there is a 
supply shock in the insurance industry, and people cannot find any other effective risk 
management solutions. The insurer can increase its own premium and the insured will 
purchase higher priced insurance products from insurers with relatively higher 
solvency prospects. This positive effect can be stronger when ܾగ೔௜  is also negative, 
where ܾగ೔௜  denotes the relationship between premium and solvency ratio. Based on 
the definition of bi in the optimization problem above, this negative relationship 
should be induced by a large shortfall of insurance coverage Q. Therefore, in the 
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extreme case with tight capital supply and high insurance demand in the insurance 
industry, the positive relationship of shock losses and premium can be observed.  
Let us now check this effect in an economy with the reinsurance market. The 
positive relation between the loss payment and the premium would be greater when 
ܥ௕೔௜  is large and negative (costly) in the reinsurance market. This is consistent with 
the statement that price spikes after a shock would be larger when the reinsurance rate 
is more sensitive to the insurer’s solvency ratio during the period of a tight 
reinsurance market.  
Finally, I find that the positive effect of losses on the next-period premium can 
shrink when ܳ௕೔௜ , which is recalled as the first derivative of coverage demand Q with 
respect to solvency ratio b, is larger. This means the effect will be smaller if the 
insured is more sensitive to the insurer’s solvency ratio. It tells us that the price spike 
is limited for the insurer with a relatively low solvency ratio after the shock since 
many customers tend to leave such an insurer. Therefore, it is more likely for these 
insurers to encounter insolvency after a catastrophic event. This also means the 
insurer’s solvency prospects matters as well-capitalized insurers have an advantage 
over less well-capitalized insurers. 
ௗ௘೔
ௗ௅೔ ൌ
௥೑షభோ೐೔್೔
೔ ି௕೐೔
೔ ெ௉್ ೔೔
|ௌை஼|∗	|௕ಽ೔೔
షభ| 	 ;                                              (3.10) 
Equation (3.10) illustrates the effect of losses on the external capital, and the sign 
of the effect is determined by cross partial derivative ܴ௘೔௕೔௜  and first derivative of 
solvency ratio with respect to external capital ܾ௘೔௜ . If ܴ௘೔௕೔௜  is negative, which means 
the external capital cost is more sensitive to the capital amount in response to a lower 
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solvency ratio, the relationship between losses and external capital can be negative. In 
this case, the external capital market is too tight, so the insurer tends to decrease its 
external capital, or makes its solvency ratio as high as possible to attract external 
capital. If ܴ௘೔௕೔௜  is positive, with the external capital cost being less sensitive in 
response to a lower solvency ratio, the external capital market is not tight yet and the 
insurer may directly access more external capital to cover higher losses.  
ௗఉ೔
ௗ௅೔ ൌ
ሺ஼೔ି௥೑షభሻொ್೔
೔ ାொ೔஼್೔
೔ ି௕ഁ೔
೔ ெ௉್ ೔೔
|ௌை஼|∗	|௕ಽ೔೔
షభ|                                         (3.11)  
Equation (3.11) provides the effect of losses on the next-period reinsurance ratio. 
It shows that the effect will be small if the marginal cost of reinsurance ܥ௕೔௜ 	is largely 
negative (costly). This implies that the insurer would avoid reinsurance solutions to 
transfer risks when the reinsurance market is tight.  
ܧொ೔గ೔ ൌ 	െ
ሺொ೔ାெ௉್೔௕ഏ೔
೔ ሻగ೔
்೔	ொ೔ ;                                            (3.12) 
Equation (3.12) is the price elasticity of coverage demand in the costly external 
capital market. It shows that the insurance premium in each state in the costly capital 
market is determined not only by its specific price elasticity but also by its overall 
marginal profit and its solvency position in each state. It means that changes in 
premium in the costly capital market can be induced by changes in the insurer’s 
solvency position. If we let ܯ ௕ܲ௜  = 0, this equation will be the same as the equation 
(3.4) derived in the risk-free capital market, in which the insurer’s solvency ratio does 
not matter at all.  
Δ௜௝ ൌ 	ሺܶ௝ܳ௝ െ ܶ௜ܳ௜ሻ െ ሾݎ௙ି ଵ൫ܴ௝ െ ܴ௜൯ െ ሺ݁௝ െ ݁௜ሻሿ െ ሺ1 െ ߚሻሺܮ௝ െ ܮ௜ሻ.     (3.13) 
The difference between the insurer’s overall profits in two states i and j is shown 
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by Equation (3.13). From the previous analysis, I can conclude that there is a chance 
for the insurer with a high solvency ratio to have a larger expected profit when it pays 
larger losses in the first period, denoted by Δ௜௝ ൐ 0.  
The first term in Equation (3.13), ሺܶ௝ܳ௝ െ ܶ௜ܳ௜ሻ , can be interpreted as 
underwriting premium spiking after a loss; and the term ሾݎିଵ൫ܴ௝ െ ܴ௜൯ െ ሺ݁௝ െ ݁௜ሻሿ 
is the extra external capital cost due to a loss. The term ሺ1 െ ߚሻሺܮ௝ െ ܮ௜ሻ is the loss 
payment difference between two states. This equation shows that the possibility of a 
positive profit difference between these two states can be increased when the highly 
solvent insurer can take advantage of price spikes and the insured’s loyalty in 
post-catastrophe insurance sales, thus reducing the effect of penalties of a costly 
reinsurance rate and high external capital costs after shocks. This is also the condition 
in which the insurer can benefit from catastrophic risk coverage across these two 
periods in this model economy.  
 
3.5 Implications for the Empirical Tests 
Implications for the empirical study are provided in this section to examine the results 
developed from the two-period cash flow model in costly capital market. The tests 
will be finished in future research.  
   In the two-period model, I focus on the effect of catastrophic shocks on the 
changes of premium and coverage capacity for a representative insurer. By examining 
the implication of heterogeneous firms’ post-catastrophe performance in the model, I 
also explore what kind of insurers with catastrophic risk exposures can obtain 
 52 
 
advantageous position after a catastrophe event.  
 
3.5.1 Hypothesis I and Its Empirical Testing Strategy 
Recall that Equation 3.9 describes the effect of losses on the next-period insurance 
price. The sign of this effect is determined by ܳగ೔௕೔௜  and ܾగ೔௜ . If ܳగ೔௕೔௜  is negative, 
this means the insured would like to purchase higher priced insurance products from 
insurers with relatively higher solvency prospects when there is a capital shock due to 
a catastrophic event. This situation can go further when ܾగ೔௜  is also negative, which 
implies a large shortfall of insurance coverage, Q. Further, an insurer with a low 
leverage ratio and a high solvency ratio can claim a relatively higher insurance price 
in the post-catastrophe market. Equation 3.9 also shows that the post-catastrophe 
insurance price will be larger when the reinsurance rate is more sensitive to the 
insurer’s solvency ratio, with ܥ௕೔௜  being large and negative. So the post-catastrophe 
insurance price spike can be strengthened in hard reinsurance market. Therefore, I can 
develop Hypothesis I as follows. 
Hypothesis I: With an internal capital shortage after a catastrophic shock, the 
relationship between the insurer’s losses and next-period insurance price in 
catastrophe prone lines will be positive.  
Note that the relationship can be influenced by the insurer’s underwriting portfolio, 
capital capacity, firm characteristics and the reinsurance market situation.  
To test this hypothesis, I would use the information from all property-casualty 
insurers with hurricane risk exposures from 1990-2012, and define the hurricane risk 
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prone line of business as the sum of direct premium written in homeowners, farm 
owners, auto physical damage, commercial multi-peril (non-liability), and inland 
marine. I assume that the price elasticity of the insured’s demand can be consistent 
within one kind of catastrophe events, the hurricanes. I use an OLS regression to test 
Hypothesis I. The empirical model for insurer i can be built as follows, 
Pricei,t = β0 +ߚଵ(Loss incurred/Total asset) i, t-1 +ߚଶH_indexi, t-1  
       +ߚଷ	Capacity i, t-1 +ߚସDummy_hard t +ߚହNew_equity i, t 
       +ߚ଺Leverage_ratio i, t-1 +ߚ଻Solvency_ratio i, t-1 +ߚ଼ROE i, t-1 
       +ߚଽLog (asset) i, t +ߚଵ଴Dummy_single i, t +ߚଵଵDummy_public i, t 
       +ߚଵଶDummy_rating i, t +ߚଵଷReinsurance t + εi,t. 
In this regression, the dependent variable, Price, is the insurance price of 
hurricane risk prone line. Price is the ratio of (net premium written – underwriting 
expenses – dividends to policyholders) to the present value of accident year losses 
incurred (See Cummins and Danzon 1997). The explanatory variable is the ratio of 
losses incurred by hurricanes to total asset in the last period, denoted by (Loss 
incurred/Total asset).  
Many control variables will be chosen to describe the insurer’s underwriting 
diversity, capital capacity, financial quality, firm characteristics and the reinsurance 
market situation. The H_index is the Herfindahl index that indicated an insurer’s 
underwriting diversification in hurricane prone lines. For capital capacity, I develop 
three alternative proxy variables: Capacity is the ratio of equity capital amount Kt-1 to 
the average of Kt-1, Kt-2, and Kt-3 (See Winter 1994, Cummins and Danzon 1997); 
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Dummy_hard is one if the primary insurance market is hard, zero otherwise; 
New_equity is the amount of newly raised equity, including new equity issues and 
transfers from noninsurance parent corporations. Three proxy variables are 
incorporated to represent an insurer’s financial quality: Leverage_ratio is the ratio of 
liability to the policyholder’s surplus; Solvency_ratio is the total surplus to liabilities; 
ROE is the net income before dividend and tax divided by total equity capital. I also 
include the firm size as measured by Log (asset), a dummy for a single unaffiliated 
firm, and a dummy for a public firm to distinguish firm characteristics. 
Dummy_rating is one if the insurer’s A.M. Best rating is no lower than “A - -”, zero 
otherwise. Finally I add Reinsurance that is measured by the catastrophe reinsurance 
price index to represent to some extend the reinsurance market is hard.  
In addition, I develop the following two empirical tests for Hypothesis I by 
incorporating the previous OLS model into different subgroups of the original sample.  
First, I find in the two-period model that the positive effect of losses on the 
next-period premium can shrink if the insured is more sensitive to the insurer’s 
solvency ratio. Since the capital elasticity of demand for the commercial line is higher 
than the personal line, I can extend Hypothesis I that the positive effect between 
losses and next-period insurance price, indicated by the coefficient	ߚଵ, can be larger 
for a commercial line insure than a personal line insurer. We can divide the sample 
into two subgroups, commercial line insurers and personal line insurers. Here I define 
an insurer as a commercial line insurer if the direct premiums written in 
catastrophe-related commercial lines of business are more than 50% of the insurer’s 
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total premiums written, while a personal line insurer is the insurer that concentrate 
more on personal lines of business. To test this extension hypothesis, the same 
regression as the one applied to Hypothesis I above can be conducted for both 
subgroups, and then the estimated coefficients can be compared with each other.  
Second, considering the price elasticity of demand for hurricane risk is higher in 
Florida than in New York (see Grace and Klein, 2004), the positive effect above can 
be predicted to be larger for insurers that underwrite hurricane risk mainly in Florida 
than those that underwrite hurricane risk mainly in New York. The sample can also be 
divided into two subgroups, insurers with more hurricane risk prone exposures in 
Florida and insurers with more exposures in New York. Another regression can be 
conducted to these two subgroups with the same methodology and proxy variables as 
those used to test Hypothesis I. Then the estimated coefficients, ߚଵ, can be compared.  
 
3.5.2 Hypothesis II and Its Empirical Testing Strategy 
The previous two-period cash flow model implies that high-quality insurers may 
benefit from catastrophe events by taking advantage of price spikes and the insured’ 
loyalty in post-catastrophe underwritings, and by enjoying a relatively low 
reinsurance rate and a relatively low capital cost (see Equation 3.13). Therefore, one 
catastrophe event could act as an accelerated trigger, splitting insurers into 
high-quality ones and low-quality ones with respect to different levels of underwriting 
efficiencies and capital raising abilities. Therefore, I develop the following 
Hypothesis II. 
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Hypothesis II: A higher-quality insurer defined by firm performance during a 
catastrophic event possesses better catastrophic risk underwriting technology and 
higher capital rising ability.  
Note that better catastrophe risk underwriting technology will be indicated by 
wider diversification, larger amount of assets, lower combined ratios, and a longer 
catastrophic risk underwriting history. Higher capital rising ability will be indicated 
by a higher solvency ratio, a lower-risk investment strategy, a lower leverage ratio, a 
higher rating rank.   
To test Hypothesis II, the sample of insures can be all property-casualty insurers 
with hurricane-prone line underwritings. We can focus on the data in five main 
hurricane seasons in U.S.: 1992 (Hurricane Andrew), 2004 (Hurricane Iva), 2005 
(Hurricane Katrina), 2008 (Hurricane Ike), and 2012 (Hurricane Sandy). The 
following OLS regression will be applied to test Hypothesis II, 
Qualityi =ߛ଴+ߛଵCombined_ratioi +ߛଶH_indexi +ߛଷRisk_exposurei  
          +ߛସUnderwriting_agei +ߛହReinsu_ratioi  
          +ߛ଺Solvency_ ratioi +ߛ଻Leverage_ratioi +ߛ଼Liquidity_ratioi 
          +ߛଽCapacityi +ߛଵ଴Invest_riski +ߛଵଵGrowth_opportunityi  
          +ߛଵଶLog(asset)i +ߛଵଷDummy_singlei +ߛଵସDummy_publici 
          +ߛଵହDummy_ratingi + εi. 
Here, the quality of insures with hurricane risk underwritings is assessed based on 
the change of Return on Asset (ROA). In the regression, the dependent variable, 
Quality, is measured by the difference between an insurer’s post-catastrophe ROA 
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value and its prior-catastrophe ROA value. Therefore, insurers with high quality are 
defined as the ones with relatively great value of Quality, while low-quality insurers 
are the ones with low value of Quality.  
Multiple explanatory variables will be chosen to represent an insurer’s 
underwriting technology, financial quality, and firm characteristic. The 
Combined_ratio is the ratio of claims incurred to net premium earned; Risk_exposure 
is equal to the ratio of the premium written for hurricane-risk-exposure line to the 
total net premium written; Underwriting_age is defined as how many years the 
insurer has possessed hurricane risk exposures; Reinsu_ratio is obtained by ceded 
premium/gross premium; Liquidity_ratio is dividing the sum of cash investment and 
short-term investment by invested assets; Invest_risk is ratio of the sum of stock, real 
estate and junk bond to total invested assets; Growth_opportunity is the change of net 
premium written in one year. All other proxy variables have been defined in the same 
way as those developed to test Hypothesis I.  
 
3.5.3 Hypothesis III and Its Empirical Testing Strategy 
The two-period model also suggests the larger the losses incurred by a catastrophe 
event, the stronger the separation between the high-quality insurers and low-qualities 
ones can be observed. So Hypothesis III is as follows. 
Hypothesis III: The standard deviation of insurers’ quality during catastrophic 
events is positively related to losses of these catastrophic events.   
The insurers chosen to test Hypothesis III should satisfy the following two 
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conditions. First, each of them should go through hurricanes in all of five hurricane 
seasons as listed in Hypothesis II. Second, in each seasonal year, their quality 
distribution is consistent with the quality distribution of all the sample insurers in 
Hypothesis II. Hypothesis III can then be tested through the following OLS regression 
with the aggregated data of these selected insurers in different hurricane seasons. 
  s.d._qualityt=ߜ଴+ߜଵ(Loss incurred/Total asset)t+ߜଶCapacityt+ߜଷReinsurancet+εt 
The dependent variable, s.d._quality, is the standard deviation of the insurers’ 
ROA change in the same hurricane season. The independent variable is the ratio of 
total loss incurred by hurricanes to the total asset for all chosen insurers in that season. 
The control variables are Capacity (see Hypothesis I) and Reinsurance (also see 
Hypothesis I). Considering the sample size is small (5 hurricane seasons are included), 
I may just show some descriptive statistics instead. 
 
3.6 Conclusions and Discussions 
In the property-liability insurance market, the demand expansion and the supply 
reduction due to a catastrophe can cause premiums to grow sharply and then gradually 
moderate until the insurance industry becomes sufficiently recapitalized. During this 
process, good insurers with a comparative advantage of intermediating catastrophic 
risks may make use of the price change and relatively low external capital cost, while 
others may encounter insolvency problems resulting from capital insufficiency. One 
catastrophic event could act as trigger, splitting insurers into high-quality ones and 
low-quality ones with respect to different underwriting efficiencies and capital raising 
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capabilities. Changes in the insurance industry are sequentially occurring with a series 
of catastrophic shocks.  
The model developed in this paper contributes to find the interaction between the 
insurer’s capital rationing and balance sheet, in which the solvency ratio plays an 
import role. I discuss to some extent what kind of insurer can benefit from the 
catastrophic risk underwriting. 
In addition, I also have outlined the empirical testing strategy for three hypotheses 
implied by the two-period model. This study also contributes to the empirical test of 
Capacity Constraint Theory to find more about the impact of catastrophic shocks on 
the insurance industrial organization and the relation between the capital market and 
the insurance industry. 
In this chapter, I have analyzed the static effect of one catastrophic shock on an 
insurer’ optimal underwriting strategy and capital raising strategy in a two-period 
model. Beyond this two-period model, I would like to analyze the dynamic effect of a 
series of catastrophic shocks on the insurer’s optimal output strategies through the 
infinite time line in the next chapter. This dynamic economy can provide us the 
possibility to examine the existence and the reason of the so-called “underwriting 
cycle” in the property-liability insurance market.  
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4	
	
A Dynamic Model of Financial Markets: 
Catastrophes, Cycles, and Capacity Constraints 
 
One can observe that sharp price changes and large capacity swings follow a series of 
catastrophic loss shocks in the property-liability insurance industry. When observed 
prices and converge quantities diverge from equilibrium prices and quantities, the 
hard or soft market is defined. In early studies, one period of “underwriting cycles” 
consists of one hard market and one soft market. In recent years, ups and downs of 
“underwriting cycles” are no longer observed as smooth and predictable curves, and 
they are more likely to be asymmetric and random. Under the background of more 
frequent and severe catastrophe events in the property-liability insurance market 
nowadays, it is vital to research how an insurer responses to a series of catastrophic 
shocks, and to explore the sources of the “underwriting cycles”. 
In this chapter, I look at the “underwriting cycles” in output markets in the 
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insurance industry by using a dynamic model inspired by the Real Business Cycle 
literature. I build a dynamic cash flow model of an insurer with a series of catastrophe 
events in an environment with costly external capital and insurance regulation to 
simulate the insurer’s optimal catastrophic risk intermediation strategy.  
The model contributes to show that the dynamic interaction between the insurer’s 
capital rationing and balance sheet can generate the non-cyclical behavior of output 
changes if the insurer experiences a series of unexpected catastrophic shocks. My 
results cast doubt on the existence of the “underwriting cycle” in the property-liability 
insurance market that is defined to be cyclical and predictable, and help to explain the 
unpredictable “underwriting cycles” as temporary responses of the industrial coverage 
capacity to insured losses. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
A rich Real Business Cycle literature has developed dynamic models to understand 
the credit cycle, financial bubbles, and macroeconomic output behaviors. The Real 
Business Cycle theory views recessions and periods of economic growth as the 
efficient response to exogenous changes in the real economic environment. In the real 
business cycle model, the source of a firm’s output dynamics can be the amplifying 
effect of shocks on the balance sheet (see Bernanke and Gertler, 1989) or the leverage 
(see Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Szemely, 2010).  
In the property-liability insurance market, negative shocks to claims or industry 
capital caused by a large natural disaster or a significant macro economic event can 
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substantially reduce the insurance industry capacity and push up the price (see Winter, 
1988, 1991, 1994; Gron, 1994; Cummins and Nini, 2002; Doherty, Lamm-Tennant, 
and Stark, 2003; Grace and Hotchkiss, 1995). Grace and Hotchkiss (1995) show the 
great effects of shocks to the general economic variables on the insurance 
underwriting performances measured by profitability. Grace and Klein (2009) indicate 
that insurers have substantially raised insurance rates and reduced their exposures 
after the intense hurricane seasons of 2004 and 2005, and they also show the evidence 
that catastrophes can influence the insurance industrial organization. 
Considering catastrophic shocks can have impact on the insurer’s balance sheet 
and capital raising, it is exposed to catastrophic shocks that can affect the insurer’s 
outputs in each period. Thus the property-liability insurance market is a perfect 
environment to study the impact of a series of catastrophic shocks. In other words, the 
Real Business Cycle theory and the related dynamic model can be one way to study 
how a series of catastrophic shocks affect the property-liability insurance market and 
also to explore the sources of the insurer’s output dynamics. 
In the property-liability insurance industry, variations of supply capacity in the 
insurance market have a significant, negative effect on movements in pricing and 
profitability, generating the market conditions associated with the so-called 
“underwriting cycles”. A “soft” period is a period in which premiums are low, capital 
base is high and competition is high. After large claims, less stable companies quit 
from the market and even some stable and large companies are left with less capital. 
Then the market hardens with rapidly rising premiums and stringent underwriting 
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standards. Underwriters are less likely to take on risk in such a “hard” period.  
In early studies, the period of “underwriting cycles” can be predictable by 
empirical testing. Although the existence of underwriting cycles in property and 
liability insurance market is well established in the insurance economic literature, 
there is little evidence that insurers are able to forecast these cycles to make a profit. 
In recent years, ups and downs of “underwriting cycles” seem to be less 
predictable. For example, significant destruction in the property-liability insurance 
market can be found from Hurricane Andrew (1992), the 9/11 Attacks (2001) and 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (2005). These catastrophic shocks tend to largely 
decrease the insurers’ coverage capacity in the property-liability insurance industry, 
and the impacts seem to be unpredictable and the effects can remain for several years.  
My study contributes to the insurance economics literature in the field of the 
dynamic interaction between the capital market and the insurance industry, by using 
the Real Business Cycle methodology to develop a dynamic model of financial 
markets with catastrophic shocks. In this paper, there is non cyclical “underwriting 
cycles” in the property-liability insurance industry any more, and instead, the 
non-cyclical behavior of output changes resulting from the insurer’s responses to 
catastrophic shocks in the model economy can be observed.  
The analysis focuses on how a series of catastrophic shocks affect the insurer’s 
underwriting strategy and capital structure in a dynamic model economy. I find that 
the effect of a one time catastrophic shock could spread and amplify over time by a 
dynamic interaction between the insurer’s balance sheet and capital rationing. The 
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simulation results show that this dynamic interaction can generate a non-cyclical 
behavior of output changes when the insurer experiences a series of unexpected 
catastrophic shocks, and thus I cast doubt on the existence of the so-called 
“underwriting cycle” which is cyclical and predictable. I suggest that such behavior 
cannot be forecasted, and unexpected shocks can change the direction of the behavior. 
I also claim that the ex-ante magnitude and the period of the changes can be jointly 
determined in the insurance market and the capital market. 
The simulation results also imply that the changes of output markets can be larger 
when the shock is more volatile, the external capital market is tighter, and the 
solvency regulation is more relaxed.  
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 is literature review. In Section 
4.3, I develop a dynamic cash flow model with a series of catastrophic shocks for an 
insurer, and I focus on the dynamic interaction analysis. A linear quadratic 
approximation for the dynamic cash model is provided in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 
simulates the insurer’s optimal catastrophic risk intermediation strategy in benchmark 
economy, and shows a non-cyclic behavior of output fluctuations. In addition, section 
4.6 compares results of the experimental economy with the benchmark economy, and 
analyzes the factors that affect the magnitude of the output fluctuations. I show the 
empirical study of impulse response analysis in Section 4.7. Section 4.8 provides 
conclusions and discussions.  
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4.2 Literature Review 
In the literature, there is no consensus on the existence and the origin of the 
property-liability underwriting cycles. A number of rationales behind underwriting 
cycles exist in early studies. The “lack of pricing restraint” theory implies that the 
cycle is caused by the lack of pricing discipline (Stewart, 1987). Companies may 
price below cost to keep market share, for example. However, many would agree that 
an insurer with good performance could demand a relatively high premium, and does 
not have to lower its rate to sell more insurance, thus invoking a price war.  
Cycles might arise from ratemaking methods and forecasting errors in accounting 
and regulation (Venezian, 1985). This scenario predicts that underwriting cycles in 
property-liability insurance should follow a cosine wave-like pattern. Venezian (1985) 
examines the cycle by a second-order auto-regression effect in underwriting profits. 
During the time of his study, the period of the cycle can even be predictable for single 
lines of coverage in some literature. However, some other tests for the causes of a 
cycle, such as those by Harrington (1984), fail to find the cycle’s sensitivity to several 
related possible reasons, such as future loss expectations, adjustment lags, risk 
attitudes, and forecast errors.  
Although autoregressive estimations (see Venezian, 1985) are then generally used 
to predict the cycle’s period in both the U.S. and the international insurance markets 
(see Cummins and Outreville, 1987; Chen, Wong, and Lee, 1999; Harrington and 
Niehaus, 2001; also see Meier, 2006), Boyer, Jacquier and Van Norden (2012) claim 
that naive inference on the existence and the period of a cycle based on the point 
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estimates of autoregressive models is biased. They cannot find any evidence of 
cyclicality any longer when correcting for such a bias. Actually, with more frequent 
and sever catastrophe events occurring nowadays, ups and downs of the underwriting 
cycles are more likely to be asymmetric and random. This phenomenon also 
challenges the analysis of the existence, the reason and the prediction of the 
underwriting cycles.   
To the best of my knowledge, a few papers have explored the property-liability 
insurance underwriting cycles by using a multi-period model. Lin (2005) applies a 
multi-period model of insurance market equilibrium to obtain a dynamic solution for 
equilibrium price and quantity. This model aims to explain the phenomena of market 
prices failing to achieve Pareto optimality for a single period, and provide the insights 
into the volatility of insurance prices related to the underwriting cycle.  
Here, I should address one paper studying dynamics of insurance markets. Winter 
(1994) develops a dynamic cash flow model to analyze the price dynamics in 
competitive insurance markets. In my paper, the dynamic model is also built based on 
the cash flow analysis for an insurer. I also have one basic assumption the same as his: 
the external equity is more costly for an insurer than internal equity.  
My paper is different from Winter (1994) in the following aspects. First, his paper 
focuses on the price dynamics due to losses, while I focus on the persistent 
fluctuations in the supply market of issued coverage. We have different assumptions 
on the pricing in the competitive insurance market. He does not assume the 
conventional economic theory that premiums equal the present value of expected 
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policy claims in competitive insurance markets, and argues that average claims cannot 
be predicted with certainty due to aggregate uncertainty or common factors. He 
concludes that the accumulation of losses can attribute to jumps in premiums. In this 
paper, I follow the conventional economic theory with premiums being exogenously 
determined by expected losses, and focus on the changes of insurance coverage 
supply. Therefore, both of us have the specific linear cash flow equations for an 
insurer, but I do not involve the analysis of non-linear demand function of the insured. 
Actually, it is hard to define the specific form of non-linear demand equations, and 
thus it is impossible to calibrate the model for simulations.  
Second, we have a different source of a dynamic mechanism. In Winter’s paper, 
the dynamic non-linearity of premiums is due to dependence among the sizes of 
losses, conditional upon the events of losses. While, in my paper, the output dynamics 
does not result from the loss itself. Instead, I find that the effect of a one time 
catastrophic shock could spread and amplify over time by a dynamic interaction 
between the insurer’s balance sheet and its capital rationing. This dynamic interaction 
can produce a non-cyclical fluctuation of output changes in insurance market.  
Third, Winter’s paper implies that insurers with limited liability must maintain 
enough net worth to make credible to their promises to pay claims. So equity in his 
paper becomes a measure of capacity in the market. However, I use the Kenny Ratio, 
which is defined as the ratio of total premiums to total surplus, to relate the debt 
capital market to the insurer’s underwritings strategy in an environment of costly 
capital and insurance regulation. Note that Kenny Ratio is generally used by insurance 
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regulators to indicate an insurer’s solvency ratio.  
In my paper, I contribute by finding that the dynamic interaction between the 
insurer’s balance sheet and its capital rationing due to catastrophic shocks can general 
an output dynamics in the model. No simulation is conducted in Winter’s paper since 
the insurance demand function is not linear by his assumption and is hard to define. 
However, my paper develops the calibration by a linear quadratic approximation and 
provides simulated results of a non-cyclical behavior of output changes in the 
property-liability insurance market. The simulation is to show that the dynamic 
interaction can generate a non-cyclical fluctuation of coverage supply when the 
insurer experiences a series of catastrophic shocks. The results imply that such an 
asymmetric, nontraditional “underwriting cycles” can be resulting from the insurers’ 
responses to a series of loss shocks.  
I refer to the Real Business Cycle literature to construct the dynamic model in this 
paper. Kydland and Prescott (1982) envision that technological shocks shift the 
constant output growth trend up or down. In the model of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), 
collateral constraints amplify the effects of shocks to the real economy. They show 
that small and temporary shocks to technology or income distribution can generate 
large, persistent fluctuations in output and asset prices.  
In this paper, I focus on the insurer’s output responses to catastrophic shocks by 
analyzing the profit-maximizing insurer’s optimal catastrophic risk intermediation 
strategies with capacity constraints in a dynamic economy. I find that a one-time 
catastrophic shock plays an important role in the interaction of the insurer’s capital 
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rationing and balance sheet due to the incorporating of Kenny Ratio into capacity 
constraints. Actually this implication is consistent with the claim in Chapter 3 that the 
solvency ratio impacts the interaction between the ability to sell new business and to 
ability to raise external capital in each period. But, further, the dynamic model in this 
chapter shows that the interaction effect will amplify and spread out over time. 
According to such a dynamic interaction, we can observe movements of output, which 
is the result of responding to a series of catastrophic shocks: the insurer’s supply 
capacity is decreased and the external capital largely shrinks due to capacity 
constraints after catastrophic shocks.  
 
4.3 Dynamic Cash Flow Model with a Series of Catastrophic 
Shocks  
In this section, I construct a dynamic cash flow model in which catastrophic shocks 
affect both the underwriting profit for the insurer and the capital cost in the capital 
market. This model extends the previous two-period model in Chapter 3 into an 
infinite time line model, and emphasizes the dynamic effect of the insurer’s solvency 
position, changed with catastrophic events, on the insurer’s underwritings and capital 
structures in an environment of the costly external capital market and the insurance 
regulation.  
In this dynamic model, I assume that the insurance price is unchanged all through 
the time line, and the price-taking insurer has perfect information to make a forecast 
of the expected future losses. In the model economy, catastrophic shocks have a dual 
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impact on the insurer’s cash flows: not only are they factors of the insurer’s 
operational income in balance sheet, but they also affect the insurer’s capital raising 
capability. The dynamic interaction between the insurer’s balance sheet and capital 
rising rationing turns out to be an amplifying transmission mechanism, by which the 
effects of a one time catastrophic shock persistently spreads to the following cash 
flow distributions.  
 
4.3.1 Time Line 
To explain the model construction in detail, I take the cash flows during the period t 
as an example. Figure 4.1 below summarizes all the positive and negative cash flows 
for a representative insurer from period t to period t+1.  
 
Figure 4.1: Time Line of the Dynamic Cash Flow Model for an Insurer 
At the beginning of the period t, the insurer has retained earnings Kt accumulated 
from all previous operations, and the retained earnings continue to be accumulated at 
a return rate of rt until the end of the period t.  
At the end of the period t, the insurer collects the total premium of tQt+1 for 
one-period coverage policies in period t+1. t is the insurance price that is the gross 
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premium per unit of coverage. Meanwhile, the insurer needs to pay for the total losses 
of tQt claimed during the period t, where t denotes the loss ratio, which is the ratio 
of coverage that incurs losses.  
In this model, I assume that the insurer is efficient in estimating expected losses it 
underwrites, with the price t = (1+ø) Et (t+1), where ø is the loading rate of the 
insurance industry to allow for a profit. A series of t here follow the stochastic 
process, whose calibration will be discussed in section 4.4. In other words, the 
premium t in this model is exogenously determined by the insurance industry. 
However, the insurer cannot predict the frequency and the severity of loss shocks, 
which is expressed as a one time positive or negative change of t. Here a high 
positive change of t that is above a threshold of catastrophic loss ratio can be viewed 
as a catastrophic shock.  
At the end of period t, the insurer also needs to repay the one-period debt et with a 
total amount of Rt. The debt is raised from the external capital market by the end of 
period t-1. Meanwhile, the insurer would raise new debt et+1 with a promised 
repayment of Rt+1 in the next period. In the real world, the insurer can also raise the 
capital from equity holders with agency cost and adjustment cost due to asymmetric 
information. Here I use debt holders instead of equity holders because it is easy to 
calculate the cost of the capital in each period.  
I assume that R is a convex function with ܴ௘ ൐ 0, ܴ௘௘ 	൐ 	0, 	ܴఈ	 ൐ 0, ܴఈఈ 	൐ 	0. 
This assumption follows a basic principal in the capital market that investors would 
increase (decrease) the capital cost when observing the fact that the insurer incurs 
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larger (smaller) losses and thus has a relatively worse (better) financial position.  
After paying out the net dividend Dt to the insurer’s owners at the end of the 
period t, the insurer would gather Kt+1 to be the internal capital surplus at the 
beginning of the period t+1, which will be accumulated at a return rate of rt+1 during 
the period t+1.  
In the literature, the firm’s owners can be assumed to be risk averse towards 
investment or dividend payments (see Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993; Froot, 2001; 
Szemely, 2010). Here I assign a concave utility function of the dividend payments, 
U(Dt), for the insurer’s owners.  
 
4.3.2 Optimization Problem 
Then the cash flow at the end of the period t can be then derived as follows, 
Dt = tQt+1 + rtKt+ et+1 - tQt - Rt (et , t) - Kt+112                          (4.1) 
From Equation (4.1), one can find in this model that the insurer collects revenue 
from total premium written tQt+1, newly raised external capital et+1 and the 
beginning-of-period internal capital Kt; and the insurer distributes the revenue into 
three categories: claimed loss payment tQt, promised gross return Rt(t, et), and 
end-of-period internal capital surplus Kt+1. 
Note that the dividend payment in each period, Dt, can be interpreted as the net 
cash flow after all the operations of each period (See Footnote 13).  
                                                              
12  Note that in Winter (1994), et is assumed to be the equity issued in the beginning of the period t and it should be 
subtracted from the current dividend payout , denoted by dt in his paper, when calculating the net cash flow for an 
insurer in this period. So the maximization problem with Winter’s equity assumption is Max ሾ∑ ߚ௧ܷሺ݀ஶ௧ୀ଴ ௧ െ	ܴ௧ሺ݁௧ሻሻሿ, and the constraint can be Kt+1 = tQt+1 + rtKt - tQt - dt + et+1. So one can find that the model 
construction with Winter’s equity assumptions is equivalent with the model with debt assumption in this paper if 
we set Dt = dt -Rt(et). Therefore, there is no issue of Ponzi schemes when treating equity as debt in this paper.  
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Next, let us look at the capacity constraints in this model. Here, I assume that the 
insurer is subject to a simple solvency regulation, expressed by the Kenny Ratio ߟt 
that is the ratio of premiums written to policyholders’ surplus. Such a ratio provides a 
measure of an insurer’s financial stability and solvency position. The regulation turns 
out to be stricter when a lower Kenny Ratio is required.  
The following capital rising constraint can be derived, 
tQt+1 / (Kt + et+1)  ߟt                                                                      (4.2)                       
Note that the constraint above is very important to help explain the dynamic 
interaction between the capital rationing and the balance sheet for an insurer, and is 
also a bridge to connect the insurance market and the capital market with capacity 
constraints.  
For the optimization problem in this dynamic model, the insurer’s owners will 
choose the optimal strategies of dividend payment Dt, underwriting insurance 
coverage Qt+1, newly raised external capital et+1, and saving internal capital Kt+1 in 
each period to maximize its expected utility of net dividend payments in the infinite 
timeline. So the optimization problem in this model can be built by (4.3) subject to 
(4.1) and (4.2), where ߚ is the discount rate. 
Max Eሾ∑ ߚ௧ܷሺܦஶ௧ୀ଴ ௧ሻሿ                                               (4.3) 
where { Qt+1, et+1, Kt+1, Dt }  Arg { Max Eሾ∑ ߚ௧ܷሺܦஶ௧ୀ଴ ௧ሻሿ} 
 
4.3.3 Dynamic Interaction Analysis 
To know the dynamic interaction mechanism in this model, let us check the steady 
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state solutions {Q*, e*, K*, D*} at first. There is no shock in the steady state, so the 
steady state loss ratio equals to E(). The insurer has an incentive to make the capital 
rising constraint (4.2) be binding into (4.4). Equation (4.5) is then derived from cash 
flow equation (4.1) with binding constraint (4.4).  
ߟ(K*+e*) = Q*                                                   (4.4)                
[R(e*, E() ) – (2- r) e*] = [( - E()) + (r-1)  /ߟ] Q* -D*                 (4.5) 
Equation (4.5) shows that the insurer’s capital rising capabilities and underwriting 
profits are mutually dependent in the steady state. The insurer tends to raise external 
capital e* to expand its underwriting coverage Q* until the capital raising cost [R(e*, 
E()) – (2- r) e*] is covered by the difference between the underwriting expansion 
profits [( - E()) + (r-1)  /ߟ] Q* and the steady state dividend payment D*.  
If there is a positive shock to the steady sate loss ratio E(), the available funds 
from underwriting profits to raise external capital is decreasing, and the decreasing 
external capital will then be reduced further with a higher external capital cost R along 
with the shock. In turn, the largely decreased external capital will reduce the future 
underwriting expansion and thus the future underwriting profits. This implies that 
small catastrophic shocks can generate large, persistent fluctuations in both 
underwriting profits and capital raising capabilities. This is to show the effect of a one 
time catastrophic shock on the cash flows in the current and the following periods. 
Note that, from Equation (4.5), the insurer will raise more external capital with a 
higher rate of return on invested assets r or a lower Kenny Ratio ߟ, illustrating that 
the insurer tends to raise more capital if it has higher investment returns or if it needs 
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to satisfy a stricter solvency regulation.  
From (4.1) and (4.2), we can also get the motion of external capital raised as 
follows, 
(rt-1) et+1 = ቂߨ ቀ1 ൅ ௥೟ఎ೟ቁ ܳ௧ାଵ െ
గ೟శభ
ఎ೟శభ ܳ௧ାଶ 	െ ߙ௧ܳ௧ െ ܦ௧ቃ - Rt (ߙ௧ሻ	+ et+2        (4.6)                        
Similarly as the finding from Equation (4.5), a positive change of t can 
negatively impact underwriting profits, which will reduce the funds available to raise 
new capital et+1. Moreover, with the total capital cost Rt increased by t, et+1 shrinks 
more deeply, which in turn limits the future underwriting quantity Qt+1. Therefore, the 
insurer’s current catastrophic shock will affect its future cash flows according to 
mutual dependence between the insurer’s capital raising capabilities and underwriting 
profits.  
From Equation (4.6), a lower ߟ t (stricter solvency regulation) leads to more 
external capital raised during the period t since the insurer needs to keep a good 
solvency position to expand its underwriting capacity; while a lower ߟt+1 (a future 
strict solvency regime) leads to less external capital raised during the period t in order 
to avoid a higher repayment in the next period. 
From (4.5) and (4.6), such a interaction between the insurer’s balance sheet and 
capital rising rationing turns out to be an amplifying transmission mechanism, by 
which the effects of a one time catastrophic shock persistently spread to the future 
cash flows in the dynamic economy. It implies that amplifying fluctuations of output 
due to a series of catastrophic shocks can be observed in the insurance market. Further, 
the amplifying effect will be larger (smaller) if the shock is more (less) volatile, and if 
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the capital regulation constraint is more relaxed (stricter), and if the capital market is 
more (less) sensitive to shocks, and if the insurer relies on external capital more (less) 
heavily.  
 
4.4 Linear Quadratic Approximation for the Dynamic Cash 
Flow Model 
In this section, I calibrate the dynamic model by a linear quadratic approximation in 
order to simulate the amplifying effect of a one time catastrophic shock due to the 
dynamic interaction discussed in section 4.3.  
 
4.4.1 Dividend Utility Function and Capital Cost Function 
Consistent with the Real Business Cycle literature (e.g., Szemely, 2010; Gertler and 
Kiyotaki, 2010), I assume that the utility function of net dividend payments for the 
insurer’s owners is a CRRA function as follows, 
U(D) = ஽
భషംିଵ
ଵିఊ  
As mentioned before, I assume that the cost function of the external capital (i.e. 
debt repayment function) in capital market is a convex function as follow,  
R(e, ߙ) = ݎ௘ߙఏഀ݁ఏ೐ 
The parameter re is the cost of external capital, and parameters ߠఈ and ߠ௘ are 
the elasticity of the catastrophic shock and the external capital amount in the cost 
function. Note that the calibration of these parameters should satisfy the consumption 
that the external capital is more expensive for an insurer to raise than the internal 
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capital. I also develop the experimental economy by changing the values of 
parameters ߠఈ and ߠ௘. 
 
4.4.2 Stochastic Process of Loss Ratios 
The motions of the loss ratio ߙ follow a stochastic process as follows, 
lnሺߙᇱሻ ൌ ߩ lnሺߙሻ ൅ ߝᇱ where ߝᇱ~	ܰሺ0, ߪଶሻ 
The parameter ߩ is the autocorrelation of the loss ratios in the time line. The 
parameter ߪ measures the uncertainty of loss ratio, thus ߝᇱ can be interpreted as 
catastrophic shocks.  
In this paper, I cite the parameters of stochastic technology shocks in the Real 
Business Cycle literature to be parameters ߩ and ߪ (see Szemely, 2010). Different 
from the technology shock, I choose a relatively low volatility of loss ratios, ߪ. This 
is because, by assumption, the insurer is efficient in estimating the regular loss it 
underwrites. 
 
4.4.3 Main Parameters 
Table 4.1 is a list of main economic parameters for the benchmark economy in the 
dynamic model.  
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Table 4.1: Main Parameters in the Benchmark Model Economy 
         Parameters  Notations Values 
Time discount factor β 0.95 
Kenny ratio η 2.00 
Coefficient of relative risk aversion γ 1.50 
Gross return rate of investment r 1.06 
Gross return rate of external capital re 1.2 r 
Catastrophic shock Elasticity  θ஑ 1.05 
External Capital Elasticity ߠ௘ 1.05 
Autocorrelation of ln	ሺαሻ ߩ 0.80 
Standard deviation of ߝᇱ ߪ 0.003 
Loading rate ø 0.10 
 
4.5 Catastrophic Risk Intermediation Strategies in 
Benchmark Economy 
I solve the insurer’s certainty-equivalent steady-state equilibrium by a linear quadratic 
approximation and then simulate its optimal decision path. Based on the results, we 
find a non-cyclical behavior of output changes in both coverage capacity and external 
capital with a series of catastrophic shocks. The results show that such the behavior 
cannot be forecasted, and the insurance market and the capital market can jointly 
determine its ex-ante magnitude.  
In the model economy, I also find that the insurer always keeps the volatilities of 
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dividend D and retained earnings K low enough in its optimal strategy. This can be 
explained by the dividend signaling theory that dividends can be used as a signal of 
firm quality (see Miller and Rock, 1985). Dividend decreases convey bad news of 
firm quality to both consumers and investors, and the impact can be amplified in the 
model economy. To reduce the bad signal effect of dividend decreases, the insurer 
would like to smooth the dividend payment. The fluctuations of the model economy 
are intensively expressed by changes of the coverage quantity Q and the capital e.  
 
4.5.1 Optimal Coverage Capacity Strategy and Catastrophic Shocks 
Figure 4.2 below shows us that the insurance coverage in the benchmark economy is 
negatively correlated with catastrophic risk.  
 
Figure 4.2: Optimal Underwriting Coverage With Catastrophic Shocks  
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In this figure, each peak of coverage quantity is always behind the peak of loss 
ratio ߙ, which means the insurer reacts after each catastrophic risk. It supports the 
statement that the effect of a one time catastrophic shock can spread to the following 
cash flows, and the insurer tends to decrease its underwriting coverage to avoid 
potential large losses when they observe an occurrence of catastrophic shocks. This is 
consistent with the analysis that the insurer with capacity constraints would decrease 
its underwriting coverage when there is a large loss ratio.  
Figure 4.2 also shows that fluctuations of underwriting capacity can be caused by 
catastrophic shocks, and more volatile than catastrophic shocks. This is resulting from 
the amplifying transmission mechanism by the insurer’s dynamic interaction of 
balance sheet and capital rationing.  
 
4.5.2 Optimal External Capital Strategy and Catastrophic shocks 
In the benchmark economy with costly external capital market, Figure 4.3 shows that 
the amount of external capital raised is negatively correlated with catastrophic risk. 
This is consistent with the analysis that the external capital will shrink due to higher 
external capital cost and less funds for debt repayment along with an occurrence of 
catastrophe events.  
In this figure, each peak of external capital is always behind the peak of alpha, 
which means the insurer’s strategy of raising external capital is a reaction to 
catastrophic shocks. Consistent with the previous analysis, the effect of a one time 
catastrophic shock can spread out, and the insurer will raise less external capital due 
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to larger loss payments and higher capital cost after shocks.  
This figure also shows that fluctuations of external capital can be caused by 
catastrophic shocks, and the fluctuations are more volatile than catastrophic shocks 
due to the dynamic interaction of underwriting profits and capital rationing.  
 
Figure 4.3: Optimal External Capital with Catastrophic Shocks  
From the simulated results in benchmark economy, future distributions of the 
choices of underwriting capacity and external capital can be affected by a one time 
catastrophic shock in current period. Moreover, due to the dynamic interaction 
between the capital market and the insurance industry, the amplifying fluctuation of 
output markets responding to catastrophic shocks can be observed in the insurance 
industry. 
Figure 4.2 and 4.3 support the capacity constraint theory that the supply capacity 
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is reduced in the insurance industry due to capital shortage after catastrophic risks. 
Further, according to the dynamic interaction discussed before, these two figures 
illustrate the non-cyclical behavior of output changes in both coverage capacity and 
external capital raised if the insurer experiences a series of unexpected catastrophic 
shocks. They also imply that such output changes cannot be predictable, and the 
unexpected catastrophic shocks can affect the direction of output changes. At this 
point, I doubt about the existence of cyclical and predictable “underwriting cycles”. 
 
4.6 Catastrophes and Output Fluctuations in Experimental 
Economy 
In this section, I analyze the relation of catastrophic shocks and output 
fluctuations in experimental economy to determine the factors that affect the 
amplitude of fluctuations in the model economy.  
 
4.6.1 Relaxed Capacity Constraints 
If I reduce the cost of external capital re in benchmark economy by 10%, and also 
reduce the elasticity ߠ௘ and ߠఈ by 4% respectively, the external capital turns out to 
be positively correlated with catastrophic risk. It is shown in Figure 4.4.  
In this experimental economy, the model economy has a low capital cost and the 
external capital market is not sensitive to the loss ratio. In this case, the capital market 
is too soft in which capacity constraints cannot work, so the insurer is more likely to 
resort to the external capital to expand its underwritings and reserve for future losses. 
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In this figure, one can find that the fluctuations of external capital, in an environment 
of relaxed capacity constraints, become quite small due to the absence of the 
amplifying interaction mechanism. 
 
Figure 4.4: Optimal External Capital When Relaxing Capacity Constraints 
 
4.6.2 High Volatility of Catastrophic Shocks 
In the following three sub-sections, I report the amplitude of fluctuations in the 
insurer’s underwriting quantity, external capital and internal capital surplus due to 
catastrophic risks in experimental economy, in order to check the factors in the model 
economy that can influence the magnitude of the non-cyclical output changes.  
The left hand side of Table 4.2 reports the percentage standard deviations of 
fluctuations in the benchmark economy, while the right one reports the corresponding 
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amplitudes in the experimental economy with higher loss ratio volatility, ߪ, from 
0.003 to 0.005.  
 
Table 4.2: Standard Deviations of Fluctuations in Benchmark (left) and in 
Experimental Economy with ࣌	=0.005 (right) 
 
From Table 4.2, one can find that fluctuations of coverage quantity Q and external 
capital e resulting from more volatile catastrophic shocks both become larger. This is 
consistent with the previous analysis that fluctuations of output caused by catastrophic 
shocks will be larger if the shock is more volatile. 
 
4.6.3 Tight External Capital Market 
Table 4.3 compares fluctuations of the benchmark economy (the left panel) with the 
corresponding amplitudes in an economy with the catastrophic shock elasticity, ߠఈ, 
increasing from 1.05 to 1.1(the right panel). 
Table 4.3: Standard Deviations of Fluctuations in Benchmark (left) and in 
Experimental Economy with ીહ = 1.1 (right) 
 
It shows that fluctuations of outputs and external capital in the experimental 
economy are both larger than those in benchmark economy. This illustrates that the 
effect of catastrophic shocks is stronger in an economy with the capital market being 
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more sensitive towards catastrophic events.  
 
4.6.4 Relaxed Solvency Regulation 
Table 4.4 provides the corresponding amplitudes in an economy with a higher 
solvency ratio, ߟ, from 2.0 to 2.5 in the right panel, and it shows fluctuations of 
coverage quantity and external capital raised are also both larger than those in 
benchmark economy shown in the left panel.  
Table 4.4: Standard Deviations of Fluctuations in Benchmark (left) and 
Experimental Economy with િ = 2.5 (right) 
 
   It supports the implication that the effect of catastrophic shocks in the model 
economy is greater if solvency regulation is more relaxed. The solvency ratio acts as a 
bridge between the capital market and the insurance market, offering an environment 
in which each catastrophic shock can have an amplifying impact on these two 
markets.  
From these three tables above, we can conclude that the ex-ante magnitude and 
the period of output changes in the model can be jointly determined in the insurance 
market and the capital market. Specifically, these results show that the changes in 
output markets can be larger if the shock is more volatile, if the external capital 
market is tighter, or if solvency regulation is more relaxed. 
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4.7 Impulse Response Function Analysis 
In this section, I aim to apply Impulse Response Function (IRF) to analyze the impact 
of shocks in losses and capital capacity on the Property-Casualty (P&C) insurance 
industry. An impulse response refers to the reaction of any dynamic system in 
response to the external change. Especially in economics, IRF can describe how the 
economy reacts over time to exogenous impulses that are usually called “shocks”.  
The focus of this IRF analysis is to examine the P&C insurers’ responses of 
insurance supply to impulses in loss payment, internal capital surplus, and reinsurance 
cost. I also check the causality relationship between insurance supply and the internal 
and external capital for insurers. The relationship between the insurance market and 
the reinsurance market is explored as well.  
In this analysis, five aggregated factors for the P&C Insurance Industry are chosen, 
including Loss Incurred (Loss), Direct Premium Written (DPW), Net Premium 
Written (NPW), Policyholders’ Surplus (Surplus) and Paragon Catastrophe 
Reinsurance Price Index (Rein). Correspondingly in the two-period model in Chapter 
3 and the dynamic model in this chapter, Q, Q and K can refer to the proxy of Loss, 
DPW and Surplus respectively. Note that DPW is the total insurance supply, which 
can be split into the insurance price part  and the coverage quantity supply part Q. I 
also define Loss Ratio (Lossratio) as the value of Incurred Losses/Net Premium 
Written by years, and it corresponds to, , in previous models. So we can test the 
hypothesis developed in previous models and further analyze the changes of insurance 
supply strategy under different economic situations.  
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4.7.1 Data Description and Transformation 
The yearly index data of Paragon Catastrophe Reinsurance Price (Rein) are obtained 
from Paragon Risk Management Services. The index13 (see Gron and Winton, 2001) 
shows changes in the price of catastrophe reinsurance relative to a base of one14. So 
they can describe the reinsurance cost for catastrophes by years. The other data 
employed in this analysis are yearly observation data in the industry level, the sources 
of which are either from Insurance Information Institution (Year 1990 - Year 1995) or 
the SNL database (Year 1996 - Year 2012). The time line for each variable is from 
Year1990 to Year 2012.  
 
Figure 4.5: Five Aggregated Factors for the P&C Insurance Industry 
I plot these five variables in Figure 4.5. Note that in order to show them in the 
same level of magnitude, I enlarge the Rein by 100 times, and meanwhile, shrink the 
                                                             
13  The index was also used in Congressional Budget Office. 
14 The catastrophe reinsurance price in1985 is set as the base of one.  
 
 
 88 
 
other variables by 1000,000 times.  
 
Figure 4.6: Growth Rate Data for Loss, DPW and Surplus 
In order to remove the growth trend of Loss, DPW and Surplus in some following 
empirical regressions, I make the log transformation of these variables to get their 
growth rate data. For example, DPW_Growth, the growth rate of Direct Premium 
Written, is set to be equal to [100 * log (DPWt /DPWt-1)]. The growth rate data are 
shown in Figure 4.6. 
 
4.7.2 VAR Modeling and Main Results 
Impulse Response Function (IRF) can be often modeled in the context of Vector Auto 
Regression (VAR). VAR is an econometric model used to explore the correlations and 
interdependencies among multiple time series variables, based on its own lags and the 
lags of all the other variables in the model. In this subsection, I discuss two VAR 
model cases. In Case I, the multiple time series that I examine are Loss, DPW, Surplus 
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and Rein; while in Case II, I check Lossratio, DPW_Growth, Surplus_Growth, Rein. 
But the methodology of building VAR model for these two cases is the same.  
First, I apply the commonly used lag-order selection criteria to choose the lag, 
based on goodness of fit measures such as AICC, SBC, FPEC and HQC. Then I use 
OLS to estimate the VAR. Next, I examine how well each univariate equation fits the 
time series data. Finally, the Granger-Causality Wald Test is conducted to explore the 
causal relationship between the multiple time series. This test is characterized by 
examining for nonzero correlations between the error processes of the cause and the 
effect variables to determine whether one time series is useful in forecasting another. 
If there is a reaction of one variable to an impulse in another variable, we may call the 
latter causal for the former.  
Table 4.5 provides regression results for Model Case I and II. Column 2 provides 
the lag order chosen for each VAR model case. The third column lists all time series 
variables involved in the test for each case, which shows the main difference between 
model cases. Column 4 is the result of univariate residuals test. For example, in Case I, 
four OLS regressions are conducted in turn with each time series variable acting as 
the dependent variable while all time series with lags being independent variables. 
Then we can have four p-values for these four regressions. In the first row, for 
instance, the p-value is for the regression when the dependent variable is Losst and the 
independed variabls are Losst-1, Losst-2, DPWt-1, DPWt-2, Surplust-1, Surplust-2, Reint-1 
and Reint-2. The fifth column provides the result of Granger-Causality Wald Test. The 
null hypothesis of the first row in Case I, for example, is that Loss is influenced by 
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itself rather than the other three time series variables, such as DPW, Surplus and Rein.  
Table 4.5: VAR Results of Mode Case I and II 
Model 
Case # 
Lag Order 
Chosen 
Model Variables Univariate Residuals 
Test (p-value) 
Granger-Causality 
Wald Test (p-value)
 
I 
 
VAR (2) 
Loss 
DPW 
Surplus 
Rein 
<0.0001***15 
<0.0001*** 
<0.0001*** 
0.0074*** 
0.5072 
0.0001*** 
0.2725 
<0.0001*** 
 
II 
 
VAR(3) 
Lossratio 
DPW_Growth 
Surplus_Growth 
Rein 
0.1986 
0.0067*** 
0.2178 
0.0859* 
0.0095*** 
0.0010*** 
0.0051*** 
0.0013*** 
 
For Model Case I, one can find that each univariate model is significant.  This 
implies that each univiate regression fits the time series data and the correlations 
among the multiple time series are significant within the lag order. Further, both DPW 
and Rein have a Granger-causal relationship with the other three variables. Loss, 
Surplus and Rein can be viewed to Granger-cause DPW. This means that the loss 
incurred, the internal capital surplus and the reinsurance cost can provide statistically 
significant information about future values of directed premium written. This is 
consistent with the previous models that the insurance underwriting supply could be 
affected by the loss payment, and influenced by both of the external and the internal 
capital situations. Additionally, the direct premium written, loss incurred, and internal 
capital surplus in primary insurance market can also Granger-cause the pricing of 
reinsurance market from the test. Thus it means that the primary insurance market 
should be considered when forecasting the future reinsurance cost. This is consistent 
                                                              
15  *** denotes the 1% level statistical significance; ** denotes the 5% level statistical significance; * 
denotes the 10% level statistical significance.  
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with the assumption in the two-period model of Chapter 3 that the reinsurance price 
will be increased/decreased in the second period if the insurer incurs large/small 
losses and thus has bad/good solvency status in the first period.  
In Model Case II, all the involved time series variables are Lossratio, 
DPW_Growth, Surplus_Growth and Rein. Two univariate equations with DPW and 
Rein being dependent variable fit the time series data well. Although the results of the 
other two univariate equations are not significant, this model fits the selected data 
well since the value of Akaike information criterion is quite small, for instance AICC 
= 0.0063.  
In this case, the Granger-causality Wald test results imply that these four variables 
can be influenced by one another, and each variable can be a reasonable factor used to 
predict another. This is called feedback system. It shows that loss ratio can have 
impact not only on the change of underwriting premium (as measured by DPW) but 
also on changes in internal capital surplus (as measured by Surplus) and reinsurance 
price (as measured by Rein). This verifies an important assumption in previous 
models that the loss ratio can affect both underwriting profit and capital raising. 
Moreover, DPW can be Granger-caused by Surplus and Rein; Rein and Surplus can 
also be Granger-caused by DPW. This implies that there is an interaction between 
underwriting new business (indicated by DPW) and capital raising situation (indicated 
by Surplus and Rein). It is consistent with the dynamic model as the model implies an 
interactive effect between the underwriting balance sheet and capital rationing for an 
insurer. 
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In next subsection, I will show the impulse response analysis for each case so as to 
know more about how the insurers respond to the change of each aggregated variable. 
 
4.7.3 Impulse Response Analysis 
The impulse response function is to analyze the dynamic effects of the model 
economy when one factor receives an impulse. Based on the estimated matrix of VAR 
model coefficients, we can generate IRFs to identify the consequences of a unit 
increase in one variable’s innovation at time t for the value of another variable at time 
t+lag holding all other innovations at all dates constant.  
Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8 are the responses to the impulse in Loss and Surplus for 
Model Case I. Recall that Case I involves the time series of DPW, Surplus, Loss and 
Rein.  
 
Figure 4.7: Response to Impulse in Loss Incurred for Model Case I 
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Figure 4.7 provides four graphs. In the top left hand corner we see the future 
response of loss incurred to a one standard deviation shock of losses incurred. The top 
right hand corner shows the response of DPW to a one standard deviation shock of 
losses incurred.  In the bottom corners we see the response from a one standard 
deviation shock to losses in terms of Surplus and REIN respectively.   
We can find that the response of DPW to a shock of loss incurred is positive, and 
the highest response is occurring in the third year. Similarly, the reinsurance price 
index has positive responses, but these responses are more intensive and faster than 
those of DPW. In the year t+1, the reinsurance price response is able to rise 
dramatically. This illustrates that price turns to be more sensitive to loss shocks. We 
may imply that the main reason for the increase in DPW after the loss impulse can be 
the increase of insurance price (premium per unit dollar of coverage). This verifies the 
hypothesis in Chapter 3 about the positive relationship between loss ratio and 
next-period insurance rate in an environment of loss shocks.  
In addition, the shock to surplus has an initial negative effect that wears off after 
about 4 periods as the response moves to zero. It implies that insurers who can make 
use of insurance price increase after shocks can avoid large loss of capital surplus, 
which is also consistent with the hypothesis developed in Chapter 3.  
Figure 4.8 shows the insurers’ response to impulse in internal capital surplus from 
Case I. In the top left hand corner, it shows the future response of loss incurred to a 
one standard deviation shock of internal capital surplus. In the top right hand corner 
we see the response of DPW to a one standard deviation shock of internal capital 
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surplus.  In the bottom corners we see the response from a one standard deviation 
shock to internal capital surplus in terms of Surplus and REIN respectively.   
From the top right hand corner in Figure 4.8, the positive response of insurance 
supply (as measured by DPW) to a shock in internal capital surplus can be observed. 
It implies that the ability to underwrite new business can be enlarged with a better 
solvency status, which is consistent with the previous models. 
 
Figure 4.8: Response to Impulse in Policyholders’ Surplus for Model Case I 
Meanwhile, the bottom of the right hand side in Figure 4.8 shows the slight 
negative response of reinsurance price index to a shock in internal capital surplus. 
This slight decrease of reinsurance price index in this case can be resulting from less 
demand for reinsurance capital with an impulse in internal capital surplus. This is 
consistent with the assumption in previous models that insurers prefer raising capital 
from the internal source to the external one. But overall, the effect of internal capital 
surplus shock on reinsurance price is small.  
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For the model case II, Figure 4.9 below shows the responses to a shock in terms of 
a one standard deviation increase in the Loss Ratio.16  Recall, CASE 2 is identified 
with the time series variables examined being Lossratio, DPW_Growth, 
Surplus_Growth and Rein. Starting with the top right hand corner, one can find that 
the response of the growth rate of DPW in the initial period is very high, and then 
decreased. The initial large response of DPW growth can be a result of high insurance 
price, and then its following decreasing can result from the shrinkage of insurance 
coverage supply when the growth-up of price turns slow. This is to support the finding 
in the dynamic model that the coverage quantity supply (as measured by Q) that 
insurers are willing to offer will be reduced with a shock of loss ratio.  In the next 
subsection, I will further test it.  
 
Figure 4.9: Response to Impulse to Loss Ratio for Model Case II 
                                                              
16  To keep the magnitude of loss ratio being in the same level as that of Growth Rate data, I multiple all 
the loss ratio data by 10 in this regression. The same methodology is applied for the Rein data. The aim 
is to show better and clearer figures of impulse response function.  
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When checking the response of Surplus growth rate to a shock in the Loss Ratio, 
one can find in the left bottom panel that the responses in the first two periods are 
negative, but these negative responses then tend towards zero. The growth rate of 
Surplus peaks at the end of the second year, which is behind the peak of the growth 
rate of DPW. This can imply that the gradually deceased negative response of internal 
capital surplus to a loss shock can result from the growth of the total insurance supply 
(as measured by DPW_Growth). 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Response to Impulse in Reinsurance Price Index for Model Case II 
Figure 4.10 above sheds light on how an insurer responses to a one standard 
deviation shock in reinsurance price index (REIN1).  The right top corner shows that 
the impact of a reinsurance price shock on the changes of underwriting supply (as 
measured by DPW) is negative. In the first period, because of possible responses of 
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the primary insurance price to an impulse in the reinsurance price, we can observe 
DPW is not changed. Then the peak of the following negative response of DPW is 
occurring in the end of third year. Based on the cash flow models discussed in both 
this chapter and Chapter 3, insurers tend to reduce the coverage quantity supply with a 
tight external capital market due to an interaction between the ability to underwriting 
new business and the ability to raise new capital.  
 
4.7.4 Extension Model Cases 
In this subsection, I try to find a way to split the total insurance supply (DPW) into 
two parts, the price part and the coverage quantity part. In the empirical research, it is 
currently impossible to know the primary insurance price since there is no easy way to 
access the data at the policy level.  
Actually, in actuarial practice, the insurance price always can be influenced by 
catastrophes and the hard/soft market situation. Here I assume that the catastrophe 
reinsurance price index contains significant information about the primary insurance 
price, and I apply the reinsurance price index (Rein) to denote the insurance price 
index in the P&C insurance industry. In this way, I can obtain the coverage quantity in 
the industry level, settled by Q = Direct Premium Written /Paragon Catastrophe 
Reinsurance Price Index.  
I have two VAR model cases in this subsection, Case III and Case IV. The 
methodology of developing and testing VAR model for these two cases is in the same 
way as Case I and II. However, in Case III, all the involved time series variables are 
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Loss, Q and Surplus, while Loss_Growth, Q_Growth and Surplus_Growth are 
examined instead in Case IV. The following Table 4.6 shows the VAR results of 
Model Case III and IV. Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.12 below provide the impulse 
response in these two cases.  
From Table 4.6, the lag orders chosen for both model cases to get the smallest 
information criteria are larger than the previous ones. That is because there is no price 
adjustment effect in the model, and the effect of variables in the economy can last 
longer than before. In Case III, the casual relationship can be found between variables, 
and each univariate model is significant. In Case IV, the results show that the growth 
rate of insurance coverage quantity (as measured by Q_Growth) is significantly 
influenced by the loss changes (as measured by Loss_Growth) and the growth rate of 
policyholders’ surplus (as measured by Surplus_Growth).   
Table 4.6: VAR Results of Model Case III and IV 
Model 
Case # 
Lag Order 
Chosen 
Model Variables Univariate Residuals 
Test (p-value) 
Granger-Causality 
Wald Test (p-value)
 
III 
 
VAR(5) 
Loss 
Q 
Surplus 
0.0160** 
0.0600* 
0.0052*** 
0.0018*** 
0.0021*** 
<0.0001*** 
 
IV 
 
VAR(4) 
Loss_Growth 
Q_Growth 
Surplus_Growth 
0.2006 
0.0190** 
0.1016 
0.0328** 
<0.0001*** 
<0.00001*** 
Figure 4.11 illustrates that the response of coverage quantity supply (as measured 
by Q) to a shock in Loss Incurred during the first two periods is mostly negative, and 
then it becomes positive in Period 3. The shape of such the response is consistent with 
the statement in the Capacity Constraint hypothesis that the insurance coverage 
quantity supply shrink sharply with loss shocks. The positive response during the 
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third period may be resulting in changes of the insurance demand part or the insurance 
price after loss shocks.  
 
Figure 4.11: Response to Impulse in Loss Incurred for Model Case III 
 
 
Figure 4.12: Response to Impulse in Surplus Growth Rate for Model Case IV 
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Figure 4.12 implies the relationship between the change of internal capital surplus 
and the change of insurance coverage quantity supplied. It shows that the insurer will 
expand the underwriting operation if there is an increase of policyholders’ surplus, 
and the expansion would stop when the impulse disappear. It verifies the interaction 
between the insurer’s capital rationing and underwriting balance sheet, as discussed in 
the previous models.  
In future research, it is better to access the coverage quantity data or to develop a 
more reliable proxy for the insurance supply part. 
 
4.7.5 Summary of Empirical Results 
In this section, Impulse Response Function (IRF) is used to analyze the P&C insurers’ 
responses to shocks of the loss payment and the internal and external capital. With 
loss shocks, we can observe a sharp decreasing in insurance coverage quantity supply 
(as measured by Q), and also the increase of total insurance supply (as measured by 
DPW) due to price spike, the increasing rate of which (as measured by DPW_Growth) 
becomes lower and lower as time goes by. They support the Capacity Constraint 
Theory (see Gron 1994; Gron and Winton 2001).  
The results also show the significant Granger-causality relationship between the 
insurance supply (as measured by DPW in Case I or Q_Growth in Case IV) and the 
internal capital status and the external reinsurance price (as measured by Surplus, 
Rein in Case I or Surplus_Growth in Case IV). It supports the statement in pervious 
theoretical models that there is an interaction for an insurer between its ability to 
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underwriting new business and its ability to raise capital.  
Finally, the results imply that the reinsurance price (as measured by Rein) can be 
affected by changes of internal capital surplus and losses incurred in primary 
insurance market. This is consistent with the assumptions in previous models.  
 
4.8 Conclusions and Discussions 
In this chapter, a dynamic cash flow model with capacity constraints is built to 
describe the insurer’s catastrophic intermediating process towards a series of loss 
shocks. I focus specifically on the insurer’s decision-making choices of underwriting 
quantity and capital structure in a dynamic economy with stochastic loss shocks, and 
find the dynamic interaction between the insurer’s capital rationing and balance sheet, 
in which capacity constraints play an import role.  
According to the simulation results, this paper contributes to find a non-cyclical 
behavior of output fluctuations in the model economy, and thus I view the 
unpredictable underwriting cycles as temporary responses of output markets to loss 
shocks. I also explore the determinants of the magnitude of output fluctuations by 
comparing the experimental economy with the benchmark economy.   
In future work, I can develop a Heterogeneous-Agent model with recursive 
computational simulations to analyze different optimal decision paths of underwriting 
and capital structures for heterogeneous insurers. This framework allows me to 
quantitatively study why different insurers perform differently after catastrophes, and 
to explore the impact of catastrophic shocks on the industrial organization of the 
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insurance markets in a dynamic setting. In addition, empirical testes in the firm level 
can be conducted to explore how insurers respond to large losses and what kind of 
insurers can perform well with catastrophic risk underwriting. 
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Appendix 2A: Algorithm Methodology for the Life Cycle Model 
 
The state space of heterogeneous households in this life cycle model is 
imax*jmax*jmax*mmax*kmax (20*5*5*4*80). I solve household’s optimization 
problem backward from age kmax with the assumption that the value function in the 
period after the last period, Vkmax+1(s’), is equal to 0.  
Based on fist-order conditions and the envelope condition, I construct 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions to figure out household’s optimal decision rules in state s, 
such as c(s), l1(s), l2(s), d1(s) and d2(s). Meanwhile, I update the new household value 
Vkmax(s) and marginal value Vkmax,a(s) for the s-sate household at corresponding time 
kmax. Then I use updated results for different household sates in period kmax to solve 
utility optimization problem at age (kmax-1). The optimal decision rules for each 
specific household state at each year can be dynamically solved in the same way.  
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Appendix 2B: Optimization Solutions for the Life Cycle Model 
	
If	m	ൌ	0,	
Vሺa	;mൌ0ሻ	ൌ	Uሺc,	l1,	l2;	nk,	mൌ0ሻ	൅	β*ሾ	φ1,k	*φ2,k	*	V	ሺa’;	m’ൌ0,mൌ0ሻ	൅	
φ1,k*ሺ1‐φ2,kሻ*	V	ሺa’൅d2;	m’ൌ1,mൌ0ሻ	൅	φ2,k	*ሺ1‐φ1,kሻ*	V	ሺa’൅d1;	
m’ൌ2,mൌ0ሻ	൅	ሺ1‐φ1,kሻ*ሺ1‐φ2,kሻ*	V	ሺa’൅d1൅d2;	m’ൌ3,mൌ0ሻ	ሿ	
s.t.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 ܽᇱൌ	ሺ1൅rሻ	a	൅	w1,k	e1ሺ1‐l1ሻ൅w2,ke2ሺ1‐l2ሻ൅		ঌ௞வ଺ହ	ঌ௠ழଷሺ1൅	 ঌ௠ୀ଴ሻss	
–	c	–	ሺ1‐	φ1,kሻ	d1	–	ሺ1‐φ2,kሻ	d2;	
Ucሺc,	l1,	l2;	nk,	mൌ0ሻ	ൌ	λ	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 ሺ	c	ሻ 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
௟ܷభሺc,	l1,	l2;	nk,	mൌ0ሻ	ൌ	w1,k	e1*	λ	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 ሺ	l1	ሻ	
௟ܷమሺc,	l1,	l2;	nk,	mൌ0ሻ	ൌ	w2,k	e2	*λ	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 ሺ	l2	ሻ	
β*ሾφ1,k*	V	aሺa’;	m’ൌ0,mൌ0ሻ	൅	ሺ1‐φ1,kሻ*	V	aሺa’൅d1;	m’ൌ2,mൌ0ሻሿ	ൌλ	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 ሺ	d1	ሻ	 	
β*ሾφ2,k	*	V	aሺa’;	m’ൌ0,mൌ0ሻ	൅ሺ1‐φ2,k	ሻ*	V	aሺa’൅d2;	m’ൌ1,mൌ0ሻሿ	ൌλ	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 ሺ	d2	ሻ	
β*ሾφ2,k*	V	aሺa’൅d1	;	m’ൌ2,mൌ0ሻ	൅ሺ1‐φ2,kሻ*	V	aሺa’൅d1൅d2;	m’ൌ3,mൌ0ሻሿ	ൌ	λ	 	 ሺ	a’ሻ	
where λ is the Lagrangian Parameter. 
	
If	mൌ1,	
Vሺa;	mൌ1ሻ	ൌ	Uሺc,	l1;	nk,	mൌ1ሻ	൅β*ሾφ1,k*	V	ሺa’;m’ൌ1,	mൌ1ሻ	൅	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 ሺ1‐φ1,kሻ*	V	ሺa’൅d1;	m’ൌ3,	mൌ1ሿ	
s.t.	 	 ܽᇱൌ	ሺ1൅rሻ	a	൅	w1,k	e1h1൅		ঌ௞வ଺ହ	ss–	c	‐	ሺ1‐	φ1,kሻ	d1;	
Ucሺc,	l1;	nk,	mൌ1ሻ	ൌ	λ	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 ሺ	c	ሻ	
௟ܷభሺc,	l1;	nk,	mൌ1ሻ	ൌ	w1,k	e1*λ	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 ሺ	l1	ሻ	
β*	V	aሺa’൅d1	;	m’ൌ3,mൌ1ሻ	ൌ	λ	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 ሺ	d1	ሻ	
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β*	V	aሺa’;	m’ൌ1,mൌ1ሻ	ൌ	λ	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 ሺ	a’ሻ	
	
If	mൌ2,	 	
Vሺa;	mൌ2ሻ	ൌ	Uሺc,	l2;	nk,	mൌ2ሻ	൅β*ሾφ2,k*	V	ሺa’;m’ൌ2,mൌ2ሻ	൅	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 ሺ1‐φ2,kሻ*	V	ሺa’൅d2;	m’ൌ3,mൌ2ሿ	
s.t.	 	 ܽᇱൌ	ሺ1൅rሻ	a	൅	w	e2h2	൅		ঌ௞வ଺ହ	ss–	c	–	ሺ1‐φ2,kሻ	d2	
Ucሺc,	l2;	nk,	mൌ2ሻ	ൌλ	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 ሺ	c	ሻ	
௟ܷమሺc,	l2;	nk,	mൌ2ሻ	ൌ	w2,k	e2*λ	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 ሺ	l2	ሻ	
β*	V	aሺa’൅d2	;	m’ൌ3,mൌ2ሻ	ൌλ	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 ሺ	d2	ሻ	
β*	V	aሺa’;	m’ൌ2,	mൌ2ሻ	ൌ	λ	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 ሺ	a’ሻ	 	
	
If	mൌ3	,	
Vሺa;	mൌ3ሻ	ൌ	Uሺc;	nk,	mൌ3ሻ	൅β	*	V	ሺa’;m’ൌ3,mൌ3ሻ	 	
s.t.	 	 ܽᇱൌ	ሺ1൅rሻ	a–	c	
Ucሺc	;	nk,	mൌ3ሻ	ൌλ	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 ሺ	c	ሻ	
β*	V	aሺa’;	m’ൌ3,mൌ3ሻ	ൌ	λ	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 ሺ	a’ሻ	
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Appendix 3:	Optimization Solutions for the Two-Period Cash Flow Model 
 
FOCs with β, βi, e, ei, πi are as follows, 
(TQbെβQCbെݎ௙ି ଵRb)bβ +(ݎ௙ି ଵ െC)Q +rf-1∑ P୧୧୍ୀଵ (Tiܳ௕೔௜ െβiQiܥ௕೔௜ െ ݎ௙ି ଵܴ௕೔௜ ሻ	 ఉܾ௜ =0 (i)          
(Tiܳ௕೔௜ െ βiQiܥ௕೔௜ െ ݎ௙ି ଵܴ௕೔௜ ሻ	 ఉܾ೔௜ െ ൫ܥ௜ െ ݎ௙ି ଵ൯ܳ௜ ൌ 0			                       (ii) 
(TQbെβQCbെݎ௙ି ଵRb)be+(1 െ ݎ௙ି ଵRe)+rf-1∑ P୧୧୍ୀଵ (Tiܳ௕೔௜ െβiQiܥ௕೔௜ െ ݎ௙ି ଵܴ௕೔௜ ሻ	ܾ௘௜ =0 (iii)        
(Tiܳ௕೔௜ െ βiQiܥ௕೔௜ െ ݎ௙ି ଵܴ௕೔௜ ሻ	ܾ௘೔௜ ൅ ൫1 െ ݎ௙ି ଵܴ௘೔௜ ൯ ൌ 0                        (iv)               
(Tiܳ௕೔௜ െ βiQiܥ௕೔௜ െ ݎ௙ି ଵܴ௕೔௜ ሻܾగ೔௜ ൅ ܳ௜ ൅ ܶ௜ܳగ೔௜ ൌ 0                           (v)               
where T = π- Cβ -(1- β)rf-1 and Ti = πi- Ciβi -(1- βi) rf-1 
 
Case One: Risk Free Capital Market with C(b) = Ci (bi) = ݎ௙ି ଵ, R(b,e)= Ri (bi, ei) = rf                
(i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) can imply that: Qb =ܳ௕೔௜ =0,  
            and TQbെ βQCbെݎ௙ି ଵRb = Tiܳ௕೔௜ െ βiQiܥ௕೔௜ െ ݎ௙ି ଵܴ௕೔௜  = 0; 
Then ܳ௜ ൅ ܶ௜ܳగ೔௜ ൌ 0 according to (v), equivalently, it is ܧொ೔గ೔ ൌ 	െ గ
೔
గ೔ି௥೑షభ
. 
 
Case Two: Costly Capital Market with C(b) = Ci (bi) =ݎ௙ି ଵ, R(b,e)= Ri (bi, ei) = rf   
(ii), (iv), and (v) can derive that:  
Tiܳ௕೔௜ െ βiQiܥ௕೔௜ െ ݎ௙ି ଵܴ௕೔௜  = ൌ െ
ொ೔ା்೔ொഏ೔
೔
௕ഏ೔೔
 = 
ሺ஼೔ି௥೑షభሻொ೔
௕ഁ೔೔
 = 
௥೑షభோ೐೔
೔ ିଵ
௕೐೔೔
; 
Then (v) can show that: ܧொ೔గ೔ ൌ 	െ
ሺொ೔ାெ௉್೔௕ഏ೔
೔ ሻగ೔
்೔	ொ೔ ; 
Next, according to Comparative Statics Analysis, one can get  
      ௗగ
೔
ௗ௅೔ ൌ
೏ሺೡሻ
೏ಽ೔
|ௌை஼| 	, 
ௗ௘೔
ௗ௅೔ ൌ
೏ሺ೔ೡሻ
೏ಽ೔
|ௌை஼| 	, and 
ௗఉ೔
ௗ௅೔ ൌ
೏ሺ೔೔ሻ
೏ಽ೔
|ௌை஼| 	.        
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Appendix 4: Algorithm Methodology for the Dynamic Cash Flow Model 
 
I solve and simulate this dynamic model with linear quadratic approximation around 
the steady state. First, I start with a stochastic finite horizon optimization problem, 
and derive the Riccati equation for this dynamic model with stochastic growth. Next, I 
solve the steady-state conditions for Q*, K*, e*, λ* by FOCs to obtain a 
certainty-equivalent steady-state equilibrium. Then I calculate the Jacobian matrix and 
Hessian matrix by using the log difference. Based on all the pervious steps of 
calculation, I approximate the return function and the state transition function around 
the steady state for this model, and obtain its value function and policy function that 
are prepared for the following simulations. I set the initial state is the steady state and 
simulate this stochastic growth model. Here I get the deviations from trend by using 
the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Finally, the standard deviations and the cross correlations 
with output of variables can be shown by figures or tables.  
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